

VISIONS OF THE INTOLERABLE: DELEUZE ON ETHICAL IMAGES

Joseph Barker (Pennsylvania State University)

Perhaps the most prevalent trait of Deleuze scholarship has been its privileging of creativity, activity and the production of the new. The contemporary tendency towards these themes is foregrounded in the wide influence of Jane Bennett's neo-Deleuzian project, to which action, the production of effects and the alteration of events are central.¹ One page of Daniella Angelucci's new work on Deleuze's cinematic concepts unreservedly claims that philosophy "creates" "new" concepts and art "creates" images as part of a "production, an invention."² Nadine Boljkovac states she is most generally concerned to "negotiate and effect the new," in another recent book on Deleuze and cinema.³ The reception of Deleuze's notion of the image has also privileged the production of the new. Anne Sauvagnargues suggests that the image opens up a "new process of creation," "new potentials" and "new processes."⁴ The image that opens new creations is thus "liberated" from the banal, to which it is "opposed."⁵ This paper will take its cue from the only "grumble" that, in his 1995 tribute, Jacques Derrida claimed to have had about the *content* of Deleuze's philosophy: the emphasis on creation.⁶ It will agree with Bernard Stiegler that Derrida is not correct about Deleuze, yet it will reveal that his critique is applicable to the highly prevalent reading of Deleuze that privileges creation and implies a Bergsonian choice that is fundamentally free.⁷ In order to show how this reading is mistaken, a concept of the image will be demonstrated in which creativity, productivity and activity are no longer primary.

The basic form of the argument posits the priority of ethics in relation to the creation of images. The standard claim in Deleuzian literature is that images of the intolerability of the world are necessary insofar as they call for the creation of new images. Sauvagnargues explicitly says that the "imperative" and goal of politics is to "think and create for the sake of the new," whilst she suggests that ethics is merely "appreciating" the "new relations" into which we enter.⁸ This essay will reveal that the reverse is the case: the creation of new images is necessary only in order to force thought into a vision of the intolerability of the world, an intolerability that is continually arising anew and thus continually demands a new vision.

Images of the intolerable are now privileged as the aim of creativity, as opposed to creativity being the aim of those images. The primacy of ethics in relation to the creation of images will be revealed by first tracing the basic concept of the image as the fundamental matter of existence in *Difference and Repetition*, characterized by the passive fusion of external elements. The problem for Deleuze is to construct an image of time that is not merely immediate presence, as it is in passive fusion. We will outline how Deleuze reads this problem in Plato, who attempts to construct an image through a test carried out by the soul that selects images based on their participation in a purely present Idea. The standard Deleuzian literature then sees Plato as problematic because he is primarily concerned with the presupposition of an ideal world and the denial of the new; we will show, however, that Plato is fundamentally important for Deleuze because the construction of images is *morally* motivated for the first time in Western thought. Plato's construction of images attempts to universalize the ideal of an *orthodoxy*, which is ultimately the State. Deleuze's response to Plato is to suggest that, rather than attempting to construct an image that universalizes an ideal orthodoxy, we must construct an image of the irreducible splitting of time, which carries its own ethical imperative. The splitting of time can only be imaged through the manner in which the present boundaries of thought continually impose themselves upon bodies, which are exhausted and eliminated by these boundaries. This exhausted impossibility of living in the present is the intolerable; the images of this intolerability force thought to abandon itself, and impose new boundaries on the present. Ethical images must be created that force thought to think its constant imposition of deadly boundaries upon bodies, rather than being produced merely for the sake of creation. In this way, we will demonstrate that creativity in itself is not primary in Deleuze's conception of the image, as the standard view of Deleuze claims; instead we will reveal the priority of ethics or the vision of the intolerable over creativity.

THE UNIVERSE OF IMAGES

In order to disclose the relationship between images and ethics, we must first examine the basic conception of an image. On May 20th, 1980, closing his lectures on Leibniz, and just months after the appearance of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze presents the central concept of the history of philosophy as being that of appearance.⁹ Images are crucial for Deleuze pre-

cisely because they constitute that which appears.¹⁰ As Heidegger demonstrates in his work on Plato, the Ideas are that “in whose light” beings themselves are what they are.¹¹ The Idea itself is something “seen,” it is the “outward appearance” “in which beings as such show themselves,” which requires light.¹² The understanding, the mind or thought is thus essentially that which “illuminates,” it is the most “sunlike” faculty of the human being, and as Bergson claims, philosophy is thus a “gradual ascent to the light.”¹³ Derrida clarifies this relation between understanding and light, in claiming that the space of ideality or the totality of the whole world contracted in the phenomenon is “light” itself.¹⁴ At the culmination of his reflections on light in the 1980s, in his *Foucault* book, Deleuze clearly shows himself to be part of this tradition of relating light and the ideality of things. What he calls “Light-being” is an “a priori,” within thought, that is able to “lay visibilities open to sight” and “to the other senses.”¹⁵ Deleuze himself directly cites Plato’s notion of “weaving” in the *Philebus* when describing the relation between light and *logos* or language.¹⁶ Light is fundamentally the realm of “qualities, things and objects,” as opposed to the realm of ideal sense and determination.¹⁷

We must now ask: how can images constitute the realm of qualities, things and objects that make up that which appears? Prior to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze invokes the notion of the image at key junctures, but always in an opaque and brief manner.¹⁸ In *Difference and Repetition*, during a discussion of Plato, Deleuze states that an image occurs within a contemplation that is not sensation, “memory” or “reflection.”¹⁹ Such an image is a living present, which makes chaotic, material and external instants repeatable by fusing them into similar cases. In the fusion of the image, chaotic instants are constituted *as* instants; as mere chaotic materiality they are not even instants and they require contemplative fusion. The *Cinema* books will go further: because even chaotic, material instants require a contemplative image to *be* instants at all, chaotic instants of matter themselves are now also images, albeit instantaneous images without repeatability, past or future. Deleuze’s theory of the image becomes more consistent in the *Cinema* books, therefore, insofar he presents us, in Agustín Zarzosa’s words, with a “universe” in which everything is “an image that differs from others only by degree”: instantaneous actions of purely present consciousness without memory, sensation or reflection.²⁰ The universe of images brings time into the form of an instant that involves a closed and spatial relation, that of movement. Things and objects appear in images because images divide time into spatial objects that are *present* and *actual*. Given that thought begins with present and actual images in which things appear, Plato and Deleuze

both face the dilemma of thinking in such a way as to comprehend time itself, which causes the present to become past and open up a future. We will now demonstrate that the problem of thinking time is not centered upon the problem of creativity, as the standard view of Deleuze holds, but rather is centered upon an ethical relationship between thought and the body. We will begin by considering the initiation of the moral interpretation of the image in Western thought, which occurred, according to Deleuze, with Plato.²¹

IMAGING THE SOCIAL ORTHODOXY

In Plato, thought always begins with a multiplicity of confused images, similar to the universe of chaotic, instantaneous images described above. This beginning is not temporal, but is the essence of the sensible, empirical world of opinion. These chaotic, instantaneous images are contradictory, always becoming one another, and thus lead us to pose problems about them, problems which demand creative solutions, solutions not previously given on the level of images.²² Creativity is inherent to the Platonic system, and this undermines those readings of Deleuze that suggest creativity is the locus of Deleuze's break with Plato and Platonism. The creativity that leads beyond present images grasps that which has never been present and thus can only be remembered through *reminiscence*. The object of reminiscence is called an Idea, and despite having never been present must *resemble* something that has already been seen, for Plato. The strange resemblance or similarity between that which has never been present and that which is present means that the Idea has in fact been seen, "but in another life" or another world, a world in a "mythical present."²³ The pure past, which in fact does resemble our present, is an Idea that posits the essence of the Same as identity, rather than positing Sameness as confusion and difference as the confused images of the sensible present do.²⁴

The strange resemblance between the self-identical Idea and the confused images of the present is not immediately given, but occurs when the confused images of the present imitate the Idea.²⁵ The Idea, as self-identical, "possesses" any given quality in the "first place."²⁶ The imitation of Ideas by sensible images occurs when the soul selects and constructs images that are identical to themselves over time, which thus resemble the Idea that acts as a selective test for the soul. In this selective test, the soul predicates the image with properties that

“agree” with the Idea, the model of sameness.²⁷ Sensible images are thus organized into those that resemble the Idea according to whether they possess the Idea’s quality in second place, third place and so on, up to those that do not resemble it at all. Images that do not agree at all with the Ideal model are called “simulacra” and are eliminated by this test. The order of resemblances and possessions produces an organized line of descent from the sensible back to the Idea.²⁸ After the line has been drawn to the Idea, a line is also drawn back from the Idea to the sensible images, to which a new distribution is brought. There is thus a “turn” to the mythically present, self-same Idea, and then a “return” back to sensible images; this turn and return is eternally necessary, because there always remains a certain confusion at the empirical level to which we must return. The eternal turn and return of the soul to and from the mythical present introduces *time* into thought, a time that arranges chaotic images into an ordered circle of resemblances to the Idea. In this way, time imprints Ideal models upon rebellious sensible images as a “law” or an “order.”²⁹

The law imposed upon sensible images removes what Miguel de Beistegui has called the “essential ambiguity of the image itself,” by dividing images into those that resemble the Ideal model and those that do not.³⁰ The division into good and bad images, into copies and simulacra, is the product of “dialectic,” which is simply the uniform rotation of the soul we have outlined above. Ronald Bogue presents this “uniform rotation” as the basic problem that Deleuze attempts to rethink in his *Cinema* works.³¹ However, although Deleuze does appear to present the project in this light in his first *Cinema* book, this is done primarily to outline the Bergsonian idea of “movement,” which frames his investigation into pre-war cinema.³² The true importance of the distinction between good and bad images is a moral one. Plato is the thinker in which we witness the birth of the moral vision of the world, because he does not presuppose a subject who imposes ordered form onto rebellious matter in the way that Western thought does from Aristotle to Nietzsche. Instead of tracing the ordering of chaotic images using criteria discovered in the subject, Plato discovers criteria in the world. What could motivate the philosopher to desire the construction of images that resemble eternal self-sameness and the elimination of those that escape any self-sameness? Only that within the world that remains “identical to itself across its variations,” the organs of power that are essentially concerned to preserve and conserve themselves, capturing all exteriority. This self-identical, internalizing organization of power is what Deleuze and Guattari later name “the State.”³³ Platonic thought that desires the division of images into the ordered

circle of time universalizes this self-same organization of power, which itself gives social authority to that morally motivated thought. In the words of de Beistegui, the potential anarchy of democracy leads Plato to turn philosophy into the “ultimate source of authority.”³⁴ In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze has not yet developed a political philosophy, but he already suggests such a social and moral motivation: the division of images in Plato is driven by thought that appropriates the “ideal” of an “orthodoxy.”³⁵ We must take the “law” and “order” of the circular time of the soul in their political connotations as appropriating the ideal of an orthodoxy. The criteria for dividing images into good and bad is thus the universalization of a purely conservative social order, orthodoxy or the State, a fundamentally moral motivation at the heart of Plato’s thought. Deleuze’s response to Plato is centered upon the ethical, and not merely upon the notion of movement or uniform rotation as Bogue suggests. The problem is not unleashing a cosmological creativity that is denied by Plato’s eternal, self-same Ideas, but rather undermining the moral motivation that posits those Ideas in the first place.

IMAGES OF THE UNLIVABLE PRESENT

We began with the conception of images as that which appears in the present or as time that is spatialized into qualities, objects and things. The philosophical problem was then how to move from these present, spatializing images to a notion of time as involving the past and the future. Plato solves the problem by subjecting present, chaotic and appearing images to a division that finds its criteria in that which remains the same within the world, an organization of power that remains the same and captures all exteriority, eliminating all that differs from it. Deleuze challenges the lawful and ordered circular time that divides images with a new conception of time as essentially *splitting*, a conception that we will find is made necessary by the intolerable world, which Plato’s thought universalizes. The argument for time’s splitting first poses the question to Plato: how did the mythically past Idea *become past*? The present cannot pass *in* the past, nor in the future, and so the present must “become past” at the same time as it is present, in order that it might open onto a future present. Derrida shares this key insight with Deleuze, that the present is fundamentally “split”: in Husserlian terminology, retention is a “continuous composition” *between* non-presence and presence, the

present is continually becoming past at the same time as it is present.³⁶ According to Deleuze, this split in time “exists forever” as *the* “inexplicable secret.”³⁷ Splitting is eternal because nothing *happens* “in” the split; the splitting makes possible all events, all present moments, even the “mythical” present of Plato, and thus all *images*. As soon as there is an event or an image, which are essentially in the present, time’s splitting is interrupted. Readings of Deleuze that privilege the creativity of the new above all else are faced with the dilemma that every creation of a new image interrupts time. We must search for a more specific criterion for the creation of images: these images must interrupt time’s splitting in such a way that the split is in fact mirrored and thus relaunched.

The search for an image that both interrupts and relaunched the splitting of time is necessary because if it was to become completed or finished; interruption is necessary, otherwise time’s splitting would end. The difficulty lies in discovering an interrupting image that does not simply cover over the splitting of time, but that relaunched that splitting.³⁸ What exacerbates the difficulty of finding such an image is that humanity is defined by thinking using representational images, and thus humanity is always, in essence, too late to the splitting of time. Thought is basically a choice regarding the mode of existence of the thinking being, which consists in selecting images from outside of thought in order to constitute a present actuality.³⁹ Readers who privilege the new in Deleuze face the difficulty that new selections are always already too late. For example, although Anne Sauvagnargues also focuses on the image that relaunched the splitting of time, named the “crystal-image,” she sees this as merely an image that “opens up a new view of the real.”⁴⁰ Whilst this is certainly an important moment of the crystal-image, Sauvagnargues’ privileging of the new ignores the fact that the truly essential moment of the crystal-image is its internal decomposition, that is, the decay caused by the impossibility of grasping an original splitting in time that we could grasp once and for all. As we have established, each time the present splits into the past, it transforms the entire past in general, and so each new present, and each human thought, confronts a radically new past, and thus human thought provides no possibility of grasping time once and for all. The first clue to a solution to finding an image that relaunched the splitting of time rather than covering it over is found in the body: humanity is united with the splitting of time in its bodily, sensual and perceptual nature.⁴¹ This problematic of the body, we can say in advance, will open up the ethical dimension of a non-Platonic image of time.

Although overly intellectual thought is continually covering over the splitting of time by transforming it into images of present objects, the body is united with that splitting of time because it does not only exist in the present. The body is composed of the deposited remains of past experience that are left over after actions and speech are finished, and thus the body is the preserved past.⁴² The remains of the past are within the body that Derrida describes as “neither perceptible nor invisible” but still “flesh.”⁴³ The fundamental importance of this fleshy body lies in its ability to cause an eruption within thought that is continually attempting to transform it into images of objects present before thought. This eruption of the presence of objects is the attitude of the body called *fatigue*. Those readers who want to privilege the production of the new have not recognized the importance of fatigue, because it involves an unfree eruption of the present as opposed to an active creation of the new. Whilst Bogue acknowledges that fatigue “puts the past in the body,” he then reduces fatigue to the marking of the body by “past exertion,” and thus it is merely the retention of past time in the body.⁴⁴ John Protevi also incorrectly relates fatigue to the “anticipation of the future,” in an essay that privileges creativity, defining life as “creative self-organization.”⁴⁵ Bogue and Protevi reduce fatigue to the phenomenological dimensions of time, retention and projection, as opposed to maintaining its *explosive* nature, marking the passive limit at which the body can no longer live in the present. The body does not retain time in fatigue, facilitating an active production of the new; rather, there is a passive eruption of the present in which the body lives. The passive eruption of the present gives us an initial clue to what an image that re-launches the splitting of time might look like, but it also introduces an ethical dimension to this image. Fatigue is essentially the impossibility of living in the present world, a present world that is thus intolerable.

Humanity is united with the splitting of time through fatigue, which causes the eruption of the present. Yet, human thought and the images that thought has of things operate in the present. The body that is fatigued escapes from thought because it is the eruption of the present, and thus in order to think an image of the splitting of time, thought must be made to confront its own impossibility. In everyday existence, when we are forced to think in conformity with a dominant reality, however, we necessarily presume choice is possible in order to make practical decisions: as Deleuze and Guattari write in *A Thousand Plateaus*, you are then “the one in command, in your capacity as a rational being.”⁴⁶ Thought that presumes its own self-sameness over time and its own command over all exteriority must be *shocked* into

seeing that it is modelled on a social organization of power that presupposes its own ability to capture all exteriority and remain self-identical through all variation, as we analyzed in Plato. In seeing that it universalizes a purely conservational organization of power, thought also sees that it universalizes the impossibility of life in the present for some bodies. These self-preserving organizations of power ensure actions are closely controlled and do not deviate from their own boundaries, and they make life impossible for bodies that do not conform to those boundaries. For example, race is the first deviation that is normalized by the structural state violence of the police. Racism “propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out.”⁴⁷ Thought that universalizes the model of self-sameness also universalizes the wiping out of non-conforming bodies; such thought must be made to see the intolerable present that it universalizes and see its own embodiment in this intolerable world.

The image of the intolerable will ultimately be produced in thought by a certain relation to language. A language transmits a set of ideal and uncrossable boundaries between bodies.⁴⁸ These boundaries between bodies universalize the borders set up by the dominant organization of power of the society in which that language is used.⁴⁹ As we have seen in the case of racism, these ideal, uncrossable boundaries universalize the spatial and temporal “end” of bodies, and thus mark the death of those non-conforming bodies. The system of ideal, uncrossable boundaries set up by our dominant global reality presently makes the “white, male, adult, “rational,” man” into the “standard” of all things in universe.⁵⁰ The body is thus a prisoner of “morality and feelings” that merely conserve unadapted, past values left unrenewed by thought.⁵¹ The regime of the present that imprisons the body in an unadapted morality, transmitted through language, causes certain bodies to collapse in fatigue. There is, however, a type of linguistic act that gives voice to this intolerable present in which certain bodies are wiped out in fatigue. This “speech act” is the production of a memory or a past that gives voice to the impossibility of living in the present for certain bodies.⁵² Speech-acts produce the memory that when one tries to decide upon a present mode of existence, a new set of bodies will be fatigued and thus life will be made unlivable for them in the present. They do this by telling the story of bodies that have no “place,” and for whom life is thus impossible. As Deleuze says, in summary, the “less human” the world is, the more we must produce speech-acts that give voice to such the intolerability of the present, and these speech acts form a kind of “ethics,” “morality” or “faith.”⁵³

The ethical voice of the empty places of the present finally brings us to the threshold of a new, ethical conception of the image because it gives rise to a new kind of *vision*. The vision that the speech act gives rise to is “purely optical” in that it outstrips any possible action or reaction and is not merely part of a pragmatic chain of use-values.⁵⁴ A purely optical vision is not limited to the system of ideal, uncrossable boundaries of the dominant organs of power, and thus it sees what is “invisible” to ordinary vision.⁵⁵ Such a vision is no longer merely a vision; it is an “immersion” of thought in the unlivable spaces of the present, no longer separated from those spaces but existing inside them. The optical immersion in unlivable space is the precise definition of a Deleuzian *event*.⁵⁶ Bogue’s claim that the event is the “passage of the power of the outside into the interstice” is not incorrect, but remains too general to highlight the true significance of events.⁵⁷ On the present reading, in an event, which might be a singular life, a world or an episode, we have a *vision* that has previously escaped our thought. Because we are always born into a conformist mode of thought, the vision of the intolerable always comes as an *event* that *shocks* it.⁵⁸

The purely optical event is a vision not just for the eyes, but primarily for *thought*. Ethics is not a question of “speaking for the unhappy, speaking in the name of victims, of the tortured and the oppressed,” but rather of *giving* voice to unlivable spaces, of which the brain is most intimate with thought.⁵⁹ Although there is a widely differentiated set of bodies, from molecules to races, which are unknown by conformist thought, the brain is the unlivable space of thought itself, “a void, nothing but a void,” an uncertain, acentered system that must be brought together with thought.⁶⁰ Any “journey” or immersion in an unlivable space is thus at the same time an “exploration of the brain” in which thought recognizes that the ideal, uncrossable boundaries it imposes upon bodies are also borders imposed upon the acentered mechanisms of its own body, which is the brain.⁶¹ The physical brain, studied by contemporary science, is much more than the “model” for a cinematic brain that Bogue posits.⁶² Rather, through the brain, thought is “brought face to face with its own impossibility” and with “what does not let itself be thought” “in thought.”⁶³ Thought that sees its own impossibility becomes a mind in which there is only an automated, uncontrollable parade of “contradictory” images that cannot exist in the same present. Such automated thought cannot choose or select images: it is a pure seer that necessarily grasps something in the world that causes bodies to find the present unlivable, and thus it grasps the unity of the fatigued body with the passage of the present, the eruption of the present.⁶⁴

In the ethical vision of the unlivable, empty spaces of the present, thought is brought face to face with its own embodiment in the brain, and thus with the impossibility of its essence, choice. We seem to be at a point of ethical transparency that might signal the possibility of something like progress based on continually unveiling the intolerable. Yet, vision also essentially *buries* and veils the unlivable spaces it sees. Vision covers over the actual, present image of its immersion in unlivable space with a “virtual” or past image.⁶⁵ In this pure, virtual image, the vision becomes “buried” “outside of consciousness” and exists within the past itself.⁶⁶ These virtual images buried outside of consciousness form layers of “meaning,” and through these layers, *history* is established.⁶⁷ In summary, we can now see that on the one hand, a speech-act gives voice to bodies, always including the brain, that have no place and thus can be wiped out in fatigue, which gives rise to a vision bringing thought face to face with its own impossibility, but on the other hand this vision covers over thought’s encounter with its own impossibility by burying it in the past.

Having outlined the speech act or sound image that brings thought face to face with its actuality and the visual image that buries that actuality in a virtual past, we must now note that these two images are in fact *rigorously incommensurate*. The sound image and the visual image do not correspond to an object that remains the same over time, like Plato’s Idea. Time is continuously splitting, and so once we bury the actuality of the unlivable present in a virtual past, a new present has already arisen, precisely because we have transformed the past. There is an irreducible resistance, heterogeneity and “always re-created disjunction” between the sonority of the speech-act and the burial of vision.⁶⁸ The very “status” of the image as such is transformed by this heterogeneity: rather than separate sound and visual images representing a single, self-same object like the Platonic Idea, there is a single image, a “truly audio-visual” image in which sound and vision are “continually separated” by cuts that are not obliged to represent actions.⁶⁹ Vision and sound are now two “autonomous components” of a single audio-visual image that only has the continually relaunched disjunction between the visual and the sonorous as its object, a “common point” that is infinite in that it is never fully achieved, just like the splitting of time.⁷⁰ The people to come, those who are called for by the speech-act, are precisely called upon to think this irreducible disjunction, and thus to continually rethink the ways in which the vision that thought has of its own embodiment is itself causing new presents to arise in which there are new unlivable spaces forming. The priority lies, first of all, in giving an ethical voice to body in such a way that a people is called

who continuously rethink the impossibility of thought, and, secondly, in covering over the vision of this impossibility in such a way that our history also stimulates us to resist the ways in which we cover over our visions of the unlivable spaces of our present.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, we must make explicit the priority of ethics over creativity in the account we have given of Deleuze's conception of the image. The common view of Deleuze claims that he sees the image as attempting to open up a "new process of creation," that it "awakens new potentials" and "breaks into new processes."⁷¹ The image must thus be "opposed" to "pervasive mediocrity," and its seeing must be "liberated" from the everyday actions of the sensory-motor system. The liberated image would "tear a true image out of clichés" and possess "intensive characteristics from reality."⁷² Ethics on this view is reduced to mere appreciation; it is "appreciating the new relations into that we enter."⁷³ The liberation of an image which forms a "true" image and that possesses characteristics "from reality" seems to open this standard interpretation of Deleuze to Derrida's ultimate critique that he "stakes everything" on "a sovereignty of the responsible human Me" that is "capable of responding freely," thus "retaining a relation of freedom" to the splitting of time.⁷⁴ We do not believe, like Sauvagnargues and others, that it would be possible to freely tear a true image from reality that would break into new creations, relaunching the splitting of time. We propose to follow Deleuze and Guattari in being aware of the immense "danger" that those true images of creation might set up even worse borders between bodies that exhaust some bodies and eliminate others altogether.⁷⁵ Again, following Deleuze and Guattari, our reading will be much more "cautious," suggesting that creation must always aim at revealing the ever-new ways in which thought causes bodies, including the brain, to fatigue, and thus causes its own impossibility.⁷⁶

To measure the stakes of our reading against the standard view, we can point to Nadine Boljkovac's prioritizing the creation of the new over "speaking in the name of others."⁷⁷ Boljkovac uses this quotation from Deleuze and Parnet to illustrate that ethics is subordinate to creation, which she supports by quoting them next saying that what is really important is "producing a living line."⁷⁸ Crucially, however, Boljkovac ignores the passage after those she

cites, where Deleuze and Parnet go on to write that “creating new elements and relations” is *not* in fact primary; thus, the aim of Boljkovac’s book, to “negotiate and effect the new,” is shown to be *not* fundamental on Deleuze’s view.⁷⁹ Rather, they go on to write that creation is always in the service of losing, abandoning, reducing and simplifying.⁸⁰ Abandoning, as this essay has shown, is the continual abandoning of thought’s ideal boundaries that exhaust and eliminate bodies. Such an abandoning only occurs in the ethical vision that the speech-act gives rise to; yet, this speech-act is always covered over by vision, which buries it in the past. The continual creation of speech-acts and images of the intolerable is necessary because of the infinite disjunction between sound and visual images; we must affirm, in this light, Derrida’s highly prescient insight: for Deleuze, the *best* thought, the *best* writing, the *best* philosophy does not merely create the new, but “lets itself” be unflinchingly “haunted” by the problem of thought’s impossibility or the horror of stupidity.⁸¹

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1. Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), viii.
 2. Daniela Angelucci, “Life,” trans. Sarin Marchetti, in *Deleuze and the Concepts of Cinema, Deleuze Studies* 8.3 (2014): 365.
 3. Nadine Boljkovac, *Untimely Affects: Gilles Deleuze and an Ethics of Cinema* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 173.
 4. Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, trans. Samantha Bankston (London: Continuum, 2012), 172.
 5. *Ibid.*, 171.
 6. Jacques Derrida, “I’m Going to Have to Wander All Alone,” *Philosophy Today* 42.1 (1998): 3.
 7. Bernard Stiegler, “Doing and Saying Stupid Things in the Twentieth Century: Bêtise and Animality in Deleuze and Derrida,” *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 18.1 (2013): 163.
 8. Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 172; 83.
 9. See Gilles Deleuze, *Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze, Leibniz*, 20/05/1980, trans. Charles Stivale, <http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=130&groupe=Leibniz&langue=2> (accessed 15 July 2014).
 10. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1986), 58.
 11. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), 72.
 12. Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 117. See also Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 67.
 13. Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, 74; Henri Bergson, “Life and Consciousness” in *Mind-Energy*, trans. H. W. Carr (New York: H. Holt, 1920), 6.
 14. Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 62.
 15. Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand (London: Continuum, 2006), 50.
 16. *Ibid.*, 92.
 17. *Ibid.*, 45.
 18. See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983): on the image of thought (xiii; 103), negation as an “inverted image” of affirmation (56), and the “game” of images (30). See also Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988): on the image as pure surface and of one single nature (41), the critique of possibility (97), and the image as primarily related to actualization of the virtual (58).

19. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul R. Patton (London: Continuum, 2001), 70.
20. Agustín Zarzosa, "Layering Images, Thwarting Fables: Deleuze, Rancière and the Allegories of Cinema," *Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image* 2 (2011): 37, <http://cjpmi.ifl.pt/2-zarzosa> (accessed 15 July 2014).
21. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 285.
22. *Ibid.*, 246; 64.
23. *Ibid.*, 142.
24. *Ibid.*, 265.
25. *Ibid.*, 127.
26. *Ibid.*, 62.
27. *Ibid.*, 265.
28. *Ibid.*, 63.
29. *Ibid.*, 67-68; 128.
30. Miguel de Beistegui, "The Deleuzian Reversal of Platonism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, ed. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 57.
31. Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 197.
32. Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 4.
33. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 360.
34. de Beistegui, "The Deleuzian Reversal of Platonism," 58.
35. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 148, 268.
36. *Ibid.*, 55.
37. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1986), 50.
38. *Ibid.*, 82.
39. *Ibid.*, 189.
40. Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 170. The new view of the real that Sauvagnargues privileges is only made possible by the decomposition of the crystal-image that she suppresses, but that we have restored to its true place as the essential feature of the crystal-image.
41. *Ibid.*, 94.
42. *Ibid.*, 189.
43. Derrida, Jacques. *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 157.
44. Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, 155.
45. Protevi, "Deleuze and Life" in *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, ed. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 242; 248.
46. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 151.
47. *Ibid.*, 448; 178.
48. *Ibid.*, 105.
49. *Ibid.*, 105.
50. *Ibid.*, 292.
51. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 204.
52. *Ibid.*, 243.
53. *Ibid.*, 171; 172-173.
54. *Ibid.*, 217; 256.
55. *Ibid.*, 260.
56. *Ibid.*, 256.
57. Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, 182.
58. *Ibid.*, 100.
59. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 28.
60. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 211; 167.
61. *Ibid.*, 168.
62. Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, 179.
63. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 206.
64. *Ibid.*, 268.
65. *Ibid.*, 79.

66. Ibid., 80.
67. Ibid., 79.
68. Ibid., 255.
69. Ibid., 252.
70. Ibid., 259; 257.
71. Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 172.
72. Ibid., 171-172.
73. Ibid., 53.
74. Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 183.
75. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 299.
76. Ibid., 150.
77. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 28, cited in Boljkovac, *Untimely Affects*, 174.
78. Ibid.
79. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 29; Boljkovac, *Untimely Affects*, 173.
80. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 29.
81. Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, 157.