

LAW AND IMAGE:
THE MINOR ETHICS IN KRZYSZTOF KIEŚŁOWSKI'S *DECALOGUE ONE*

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THE DECALOGUE AND THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALITY

Krzysztof Kieślowski's television series *The Decalogue* (*Dekalog*, 1988) lacks a continuous narrative thread between its ten stand-alone episodes, but the separate stories are tied together by shared location, that is, a housing estate in Warsaw. In this barren, alienating environment of grey concrete, the lives of the characters interlace only faintly as the protagonists of one episode occasionally appear at the margins of another. The characters are often depicted diminished against the background of impersonal high-rise apartment blocks creating the impression of powerlessness, of individuals never quite in control of their own lives. Such pictorial compositions reflect the uncertainty of the characters' situation. Their lives are permeated by complex ethical problems that appear irresolvable and inescapable. Experiences of struggle and loss seem to be dictated solely by the arbitrariness of chance and coincidence, thus questioning the efficacy of all conscious moral deliberation; the whole motif of moral choice becomes shrouded in ambiguity.

The descriptions of the muddled moral landscape of everyday existence function as a counterpoint to the ostensible clarity, certainty, and irrefutability of the Ten Commandments alluded to in the series' title. The explicit reference to a core text of Judeo-Christian moral legislation signals an apparent incongruity within the series between ideal law and actual experience. Thereby, a fundamental duality is introduced to the ethical subject matter of *The Decalogue*. William Bartley traces the origins of this incongruity to the series' tendency to portray unique, coincidental, and inconsistent circumstances: because rule-making will never be able to satisfactorily anticipate such singular situations, they pose a challenge to the authority of the commandments.¹ More generally, the series can be perceived as spanning two planes: the universal and the local, or the transcendent and the worldly. The ethical dilemmas it raises trigger a constant probing of the correspondences and tensions between these planes. This procedure in the series of linking the abstract with the specific has been described by Paul Coates as a reciprocal movement where "concrete events blunt the maxims' abstraction" while "the maxims universalise the stories."²

Kieślowski scholarship tends to emphasise the importance of the universal within this dual ethical composition of *The Decalogue*. For example, the series is typically considered as inaugurating a more general shift within Kieślowski's oeuvre towards the universal and away from the overtly political and narrowly Polish concerns of his earlier documentaries and fiction films.³ Similarly, Eva Badowska and Francesca Parmeggiani see the series' connection to the Ten Commandments and the concomitant

“depoliticizing and aestheticizing” of its narratives as achieving a “near-universality of the films”, which is aligned with Kieślowski’s aspiration to “artistic universality.”⁴ According to Joseph G. Kickasola, *The Decalogue* demonstrates the richness, complexity, and continued relevance of the “ten universal arenas of moral choice” demarcated by the commandments. Yet, “amid the complexities of contemporary life,” these moral rules are obscured from view and difficult to grasp.⁵ For Annette Insdorf, too, the central question posed by the series concerns the true spirit of the commandments and their applicability today.⁶ All these interpretations agree on the idea that the central aesthetic gesture of *The Decalogue* consists of affirming a universal, transcendent, or ideal reference point as an auspicious but elusive horizon for its cinematic images. This view is appositely summarised by Kickasola, who compares the series’ treatment of the problematic interrelation between ideal law and actual experience to Plato’s cave: Kieślowski’s characters may be able to glimpse the ideal, occasionally and only on the periphery, but most of the time their perception is limited to “shadows of the truth.”⁷

In this paper, however, I will question the presupposition of universality and ideality by suggesting that the principal aesthetic gesture of *The Decalogue* is rather an inverse one: instead of acknowledging the elusive possibility of transcendence and consequently exploring its arduous reconciliation with actual experience, the series describes the collapse of all appeals to an ideal morality. In this respect, the series’ connection to its biblical source material, this encounter between image and law, can be described as deconstructive. Thus, the ethical problem at the heart of the series in the end pertains less to bridging the duality between the ideal and the worldly than to exploring the difficult ethical situation that ensues when the promise of a solid moral ground is lost altogether. I will limit the scope of the paper to the first episode of the series, *Decalogue One*. The narrow focus is based on the hypothesis that it is this first film that most precisely articulates the denial of the possibility of a universal moral law and, thus, creates the ethical framework that orientates all subsequent episodes.

I will attempt to locate the series’ negation of transcendent law within the “minor” tradition of ethical thought that Gilles Deleuze traces in the history of philosophy, from Epicurus through Baruch Spinoza to Friedrich Nietzsche. Drawing upon this lineage of thinking, Deleuze maintains a sharp distinction between ethics and morality. He defines morality as a “system of judgement” that “always refers existence to transcendent values”, while ethics denotes “a typology of immanent modes of existence.”⁸ Hence, morality determines a domain of law and obedience, whereas ethics designates a practice of knowledge and evaluation of relations and encounters between bodies. Invoking Spinoza, Deleuze emphasises that ethics does not constitute merely a theoretical alternative to morality, but it necessarily involves a radical, practical method of overthrowing morality and denouncing “all the falsifications of life, all the values in the name of which we disparage life.”⁹ I will propose that a comparable cinematic method is at work in *The Decalogue*, where the system of judgement of the Ten Commandments is supplanted by an immanent ethics in and of the image.

The paper begins with a brief excursion to the Spinozist-Deleuzean conception of ethics, followed by a clarification of its proposed affinity with *The Decalogue*. After this, the paper will proceed to a closer

analysis of *Decalogue One*, concentrating particularly on the themes of judgement, perception and motion.

ETHICS OF JOY AND VISION

In Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, the main ethical problems are equally also problems of epistemology: we have an essential ethical responsibility to become aware of the natural and habitual conditions of human perception, which limit its scope and prevent us from forming adequate ideas. Furthermore, this analysis of our boundedness initiates a subsequent affirmative insistence to overcome such limitations in order to become capable of comprehending the world in an adequate way that is truly representative "of what we are and of what things are."¹⁰

What each existing body¹¹ is can be defined by its capacity for being affected.¹² This capacity is exercised every time one's body encounters another body. In these encounters, the natures of the two bodies in question can either agree or disagree. If the encounter is favourable, the bodies enter into composition with one another and one's power of acting increases as a result of the new combination. This increase in one's own capability for activity is experienced as a feeling of joy. On the other hand, if one's body encounters another body that proves incompatible with it, they cannot achieve any beneficial combinatory agreement. Instead, the other body may set to decompose one's own, functioning as a limitation or hindrance of its power of acting.¹³ In such encounters, then, one's capacity for being affected is not manifested as a power of acting but rather as a power of being acted upon.¹⁴ This passive state of undergoing a limitation on one's power is accompanied by the feeling of sadness.¹⁵ Spinoza designates these passages between states of increased or diminished power of acting and their accompanying feelings with the concept of "affect."¹⁶

An encounter between two bodies can be adequately represented by an idea that is able to comprehend the nature of the bodies in question as well as the combinatory laws that regulate the composition and decomposition of their mutual relations.¹⁷ Such ideas are adequate, and thus necessarily true.¹⁸ They connect to one another in a causal and necessary order under the attribute of thought, and their truthful representativeness is assured by the fact that a parallel order and connection pertains also to things under the attribute of extension.¹⁹

Yet, this all-pervasive order of true causes tends to elude human perception and knowledge: under the natural conditions of perception, we register only "affections," that is, the modifications that one's affected body undergoes in an encounter with an external body. In other words, we perceive only what happens to us, or the effects as separated from their real causes. Therefore, our ideas of affections are necessarily inadequate. They are not explained exclusively by one's own power, since they are reliant on the presence and effect of an external body. Accordingly, the mind cannot be purely active when it forms these ideas; there is a limitation on its power as it is acted upon by something external to itself.²⁰ Through its natural and subjective boundedness, thus, the human mind is condemned to an inadequate epistemic

state of “confused and fragmentary knowledge.”²¹ Spinoza terms this mode of knowing “the first kind of knowledge” or “imagination.”²²

The difference between inadequate and adequate knowledge manifests itself in an individual as the difference between activity and passivity: “Insofar as it [the mind] has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active; and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.”²³ This duality repeats in the affects caused²⁴ by the mind’s ideas. Adequate ideas are explained solely by one’s own power, and as such they function as an adequate cause for active affects of joy. Inadequate ideas, on the contrary, always involve an external cause and hence give rise to affects which must derive from something outside the individual as well. These kinds of affects are passive affects or passions: they keep the affected body separated from its power of acting. As a diminishment of one’s power, sadness is invariably a passion, but, importantly, joy will be passive, too, as long as its cause remains in an external object. Thus, even though passive joy involves an increase in one’s power of acting, it does not reach the “point of conversion” where one becomes truly active.²⁵

Spinoza’s definitions of adequate and inadequate ideas, together with his mapping of the habitual ways in which human beings perceive and know the world, lead to a fundamental epistemological problem: “How do we manage to form adequate ideas [...] given that the natural conditions of our perception condemn us to have only inadequate ideas?”²⁶ The movement towards adequate ideas must overcome those natural bounds and strive “to capture the power of the body beyond the given conditions of our knowledge, and to capture the power of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness.”²⁷ Within this decisive cognitive task, epistemology aligns with the practice of ethics in a common pursuit of true activity: the objective of forming adequate ideas is simultaneously an ethical striving towards coming into full possession of one’s power of acting and achieving the maximum of active affects of joy. The epistemological designations of the adequate and the inadequate thus correspond exactly to the ethical difference between strength and weakness, or between freedom and boundedness.²⁸ In an inadequate state of knowledge, an individual is “determined externally [...] to regard this or that.” This leads to an existence dominated by passive affects, as the individual remains a prisoner of circumstance left at the mercy of fortuitous encounters. However, if one arrives at a correct use of reason conducted through an internal determination, one becomes capable of forming adequate ideas, of “regarding several things at the same time, to understand their agreement, their differences, and their opposition.”²⁹ This kind of comprehension of the order of true causes is a prerequisite for ethics as a relational practice that joins the individual to other beings whose natures agree with its own.³⁰

In *Ethics*, Spinoza develops the theory of common notions to explain the nature of this ethico-epistemological process, which can lead an individual beyond the given conditions of human cognition and towards an adequate knowledge of the world. Spinoza defines common notions as ideas of something in common between different bodies. At their most general, these notions represent things that are common to all bodies, such as extension or motion and rest. At their least general, they capture

commonalities merely between an individual body and at least one other body external to it.³¹ Yet, wherever they are located within this continuum of generality, these notions must, by their nature, be adequate in the human mind.³²

Common notions are representations of either eternal truths or eternal laws of nature. Here, an eternal truth refers to a singular essence or rather to an individual's characteristic relation in which an essence expresses itself.³³ Eternal laws, on the other hand, are laws of composition and decomposition that determine the outcome of every encounter between two distinct bodies in their characteristic relations.³⁴ Together, eternal truths and eternal laws comprise the order of true, constitutive causes, and through common notions human beings are capable of comprehending this order adequately. In this way, common notions combine into a system of adequate ideas, which Spinoza designates as "the second kind of knowledge" or "reason."³⁵

Still, the question remains: how do we manage to form common notions? The first step in the practical process towards adequate knowledge and away from the natural passivity of human existence involves a heightened attentiveness to joyful passions. Learning from these instances of joy, one can begin through an effort of reason to attempt to organise one's encounters so as to avoid sad passions and to maximise the number of passive affects of joy.³⁶ This is a practice of experimentation with the goal of discovering what the body can do.³⁷ It is specifically in this sense that Deleuze characterises Spinoza's ethics as an ethology: it is a matter of studying through experimentation the characteristic relation of a body and its relations with the world, that is, what bodies it can affect or be affected by.³⁸

Even though the accumulation of joyful passions increases one's power of acting, it is not enough in itself to induce the conversion to true activity. Therefore, there is a second step in this method of aiming towards adequate ideas and active joy: the passive affects of joy have to be used as an aid for the formation of common notions. Given that their occurrence indicates an agreement between two bodies, the joyful passions provide a route for forming an idea of the specific commonalities between the two bodies in question. This resulting idea is a common notion on the lowest level of generality. As such, it is necessarily adequate, and its comprehension gives rise to an experience of active joy. This conversion from the inadequateness of the ideas causing joyful passions to the adequateness of common notions requires traversing a gap between two modes of knowledge that differ in kind. It necessitates a genuine "leap" from one to the other.³⁹ Finally, the formation of common notions then proceeds from the least general level to degrees of more generality: following the initial common notions and active affects, one becomes capable of deducing further notions, which in turn give rise to new affects of active joy.⁴⁰

In summary, the epistemological and ethical impetus within Spinoza's philosophy and Deleuze's interpretation of it concerns the relation between two kinds of knowledge. On one hand, there are the naturally limited and habitually organised forms of thought and perception that provide a fragmented and extrinsic understanding of the world and condemn the individual to a passive state undergoing the effects of external things. On the other hand, there are the common notions or adequate ideas that represent the

internal structuring of reality and facilitate an ethics of joy and activity. Between these two modes of knowledge there is a difference in kind, and the task of philosophy is to reach a point of conversion or to effectuate a leap from one to the other.

From this point of view, philosophy can be understood as a science of effects: it reveals our habitual ways of perceiving the world as a realm of mere effects whose process of production must be studied by connecting them to their necessary and rational causes.⁴¹ Spinoza, the philosopher and lens-grinder, requires philosophy to assume an aspect of optics: its function becomes one of optical rectification of the natural distortions of perception. The ethics of joy necessitates a “new vision.”⁴² This emphasis on vision and optical effects suggests a possible zone of proximity between Spinoza’s philosophy and film theory in general.

More particularly, Spinoza’s ethical urgency to see what appears imperceptible pervades also Kieślowski’s work. For example, a tentative connection can be made to Kieślowski’s oft-quoted statement regarding his own documentary films, where he likens actual life in communist Poland to living in a “world without representation”⁴³: when the state defines and restricts the range of acceptable representations, the filmmaker has the responsibility to reveal the inadequateness of this official viewpoint and describe a reality that is excluded by it.

The aspiration to describe a world that escapes description appropriates the camera lens as an instrument of rectification against distortions and omissions in perception, which are, in this case, a result of societal rather than natural preconditions. Yet, even after shifting from documentary to fiction film and to less overtly political subject matter, the theme of a ‘deeper’, internal structure of nature concealed from ordinary view repeats in Kieślowski’s films. In *The Decalogue*, this theme is approached from the point of view of ethics; the series poses the question: what is hidden beneath the seemingly irresolvable ethical dilemmas of everyday experience? An ideal, transcendent morality appears as one possible answer to this question, but the series’ fundamental aesthetic gesture, I claim, consists of a rebuttal of that reply and of a search for an alternative, non-moral vision. For Spinoza, morality is a misinterpretation of the world that can be attributed to the first kind of knowledge among all the other illusions of human thought under its natural conditions. Thus, the leap from the first kind of knowledge to the second also implies a conversion from morals to a minor ethics. In this conversion lies the ‘methodological affinity’ between Spinoza’s *Ethics* and Kieślowski’s *The Decalogue*.⁴⁴

MORALITY AND MISPERCEPTION

Belonging to different kinds of knowledge, there is a difference in nature between morality and ethics. Yet, in practice, they tend to be perceived confusedly. Spinoza illustrates such a misperception with the help of the biblical story of Adam and the tree of knowledge. He stresses that God’s command to Adam not to eat of the tree must be understood as a revelation of the natural consequences that would occur if

Adam were to eat the fruit. In other words, the command functions simply as a disclosure of an eternal truth of nature: the fruit would have a poisonous effect on the constitution of the human body because their characteristic relations are not compatible. Yet, Adam misinterprets God's revelation to be a moral law and thereby entirely transforms the character of the situation. Namely, the warning of potential consequences no longer pertains in Adam's mind to the intrinsic nature of the encounter between him and the fruit but rather to God's will and God's power to demand obedience to that will.⁴⁵

Adam's misinterpretation is a symptom of his lack of adequate knowledge: he retains only the effect of the encounter, that is, the decrease in his own power of acting, and has no understanding of the true cause of the event. Having no recourse to the characteristic relations and natural laws of combination that determine the outcome of the encounter, Adam posits a universal moral law instead. From a moral perspective, the act of Adam eating the fruit can be judged to be evil because it represents a violation of moral law, and the undesirable consequences of his act can be explained as God's punishment for the transgression. However, through an adequate understanding of the order of true causes, all such judgements based on the transcendent categories of the morally good and the morally evil are exposed as unfounded.⁴⁶ As an alternative, Spinoza proposes a genuine ethics that replaces the judgements of good and evil with evaluations of good and bad encounters between bodies. Here, "the good" refers to encounters that cause joy and increase the body's power of acting, and "the bad" indicates sadness and the diminishment of one's power.⁴⁷

In addition to the story of Adam, Spinoza notes that a similar confusion between morality and ethics concerns all interpretations of Scripture that make God into a lawgiver, including the Ten Commandments: "not knowing God's existence as an eternal truth, it was inevitable that they [the Hebrews] should have perceived as a law what was revealed to them in the Decalogue, namely, that God existed, and that God alone must be worshipped."⁴⁸ In like manner, in *The Decalogue*, the idea of the Ten Commandments as constituting a universal moral law inevitably appears as one possible interpretation of the series: the commandments promise an ideal clarity of assessment and an unwavering certainty of judgement that offer hope of a resolution when set against the obscure actual situations and ethical problems described in the episodes.

However, this "inevitable misperception" of eternal truth as moral law is rectified within the series through its refusal of judgement as the inseparable corollary of a morality. This aspect in Kieślowski's work is noted also by Tadeusz Sobolewski, who claims that *The Decalogue* adopts the point of view of a defendant, not a judge, in relation to its characters. Thus, it replaces judgement with a feeling of solidarity.⁴⁹ The characters in the series have difficulties in appraising their situation correctly: they do not know the true causes of the events they undergo, nor can they foresee the myriad consequences of their own decisions and actions. Eddy Troy maintains that it is precisely this state of imperfect knowledge in Kieślowski's films that also precludes the possibility of judgement. Namely, judging would imply the kind of position of mastery which the epistemic uncertainty of the situation expressly disallows.⁵⁰ Troy's

interpretation resonates with Spinoza's emphasis on the natural epistemic inadequacy of human beings and with his denial of morality and judgement as a wrong method to counter that inadequacy.

JUDGEMENT AND DEATH

Decalogue One relates a story of the death of a child, the 12-year-old Pawel (Wojciech Klata). The first part of the film depicts his everyday life embedded between two contrary worldviews: the scientific and rationalist outlook of his father, Krzysztof (Henryk Baranowski), and the deep-seated Christian faith of his aunt, Irena (Maja Komorowska). Krzysztof entertains his son by presenting him with puzzles and mathematical calculations to solve on their computer. One exercise that they engage in together involves calculating the thickness of the ice on a nearby lake to determine whether it is safe for Pawel to try out his new ice-skates. Before giving his son permission to skate, Krzysztof confirms the results provided by the computer by going to the lake himself and testing the strength of the ice. Despite all precautions, the ice does not hold, and the child drowns. The second part of the film follows Krzysztof's increasingly desperate search for Pawel, when he does not return from school. The search ends at the lake, where a large crowd has gathered to witness the boy's body being retrieved from under the water.

The film follows in detail the conscientious, empirical process of acquiring knowledge of the possible outcomes of an encounter between Pawel and the frozen lake. Yet, this whole process is invalidated by Pawel's eventual death, which appears to suspend causation and elude rational explanation altogether. Krzysztof's scientifically oriented viewpoint proves unable to accommodate the dawning realization of what has happened; the event is imbued with a sense of inconceivability, as he cannot locate it within the order of true causes. His consequent powerless disbelief and stubborn denial are exemplified by his words to another worried parent: "Calm down, the ice couldn't break." Because Pawel's death cannot be confined to the empirical, it suggests rather "malicious intervention by a providence."⁵¹ The sequence of the episodes in *The Decalogue* follows the traditional numbering of the Ten Commandments, so that each film coincides, more or less directly, with its corresponding commandment. Accordingly, connecting *Decalogue One* to the first commandment "you shall have no other gods before me"⁵² implies a possible motivation for the malicious intervention and suggests a moral interpretation of the whole story. It becomes a tale of transgression and punishment: Krzysztof has elevated human reason with its pretensions to certainty above God and is therefore punished and robbed of his son. The indication of Krzysztof's guilt is supported as well by the film's somewhat schematic duality between religiosity and rationalism.

Yet, a moral explanation of this kind is contradicted by several elements in the film. First of all, there appears to be no real conflict between Irena's religiosity and Krzysztof's scientific point of view. The two aspects coexist harmoniously in Pawel's life, and he himself follows both paths enthusiastically without giving preference to either. Secondly, Pawel's death is, self-evidently, irreconcilable with Irena's faith, too. When Pawel asks her to describe God, Irena says that "God is very simple, if you have faith" and

equates Him with the love between her and Pawel; certainly, the God she believes in, the God residing in the bond between aunt and nephew, would not allow the ice to break. In the end, neither Krzysztof's empirical knowledge nor Irena's religious belief can offer an adequate understanding of Pawel's fate or provide any consolation. The certainty of his cognition and the simplicity of her faith both dissolve.

Thus, the suggestion of the possibility of godly intervention in *Decalogue One* does not occur in conjunction with faith or in opposition to reason. Rather, it appears solely in the context of judgement. If the consequences of the encounter between Pawel and the lake are to be explained by inferring the will of a transcendent God as cause, that God must be a judge that uses an innocent child as an instrument for His punishment. In a sense, this option functions in Kieślowski's film as a revelation of the cruel inner logic that is involved in all judgement, its "hatred of life" together with "all these transcendent values that are turned against life."⁵³ Echoing the statements by Sobolewski and Troy mentioned above, it could be argued that by illustrating very literally how judgement opposes life, the film carries out a disavowal of the position of judge in general. In an analogous way, Mirosław Przyłipiak interprets *The Decalogue* as problematizing the foundational Christian idea of sacrifice, which "constitutes the main structural and conceptual axis" of the series and receives perhaps its most striking rejection in the first episode: "the son should not die because of his father's 'misguided' faith."⁵⁴

Through its refutation of judgement, sacrifice, and, consequently, universal moral law, *Decalogue One* could be said to determine the whole series' relation to the Ten Commandments. At the moment of Pawel's death, the possibility of interpreting the commandments as an ideal morality becomes problematic. Their status as a transcendent reference point, against which the characters' actions could be measured and judged, is undermined. Rather, the commandments assume an immanent function within the series as a structural device. In the same sense, Emma Wilson notes Kieślowski's use of "a literal and metaphoric legal system as infrastructure in his cinema" while indicating that this does not imply an affirmation of these systems of judgement, because "the guardians of the legal system are themselves as much on trial."⁵⁵

When the Ten Commandments are emptied of their moral quality, they do not operate in a legislative or judicial manner, but the relation between the text and the series becomes purely compositional and a complex network of thematic correspondences and structural parallels is established between them. For example, the biblical first commandment has a heightened structural importance within the textual whole: by asserting the authority of God, it also functions as a necessary condition for all the other commandments as they derive from that same authority. Notably, *Decalogue One* adopts an equivalent structural function of defining the conditions for the rest of the series. This conditioning takes place in an inverse manner, however, as the film problematizes the authority of the moral law and seeks to rectify the moralist mistake of invoking a judging God when no other cause can be perceived.

Decalogue One differs from all the other episodes of the series since it involves no specific ethical dilemma or difficult choice which the protagonists need to resolve; there is only the unexplained event at the lake and its horrid consequences. Therefore, the ethical inquiry that arises in the film seems to be ethical in a very Spinozan manner. It is an issue of knowledge and vision: How to understand Pawel's fate? How to perceive the accident adequately? Finding an answer to these questions becomes a prerequisite for Krzysztof and Irena to be able to confront the intolerability of a world where children die inexplicably and needlessly. The ethical and the epistemological intertwine in their experience in a manner that also orientates all the following episodes and defines the ethical framework within which the ensuing dilemmas and problems are formed.

Thus, there are two ways in which *Decalogue One* designates the conditions for the whole series. First, it affirms an immanent interpretation of the Ten Commandments, shifting the focus from morality to ethics or from judgement and guilt to thought and perception. However, the revelation of morality as an illusion caused by inadequate knowledge is not in itself sufficient to overcome the characters' inadequate epistemic state. Therefore, secondly, this epistemological uncertainty of the first episode goes on to infiltrate the whole series and becomes its fundamental ethical problem.

The ethical questioning in *Decalogue One* is located at the limit between the seen and the unseen. This limit importantly also involves the relation between what is included in the image and what is excluded from it, that is, the relation between the in-frame and the out-of-frame. Thus, the mysterious quality of Pawel's death is underscored by the fact that it takes place out-of-frame, literally beyond perception. Furthermore, the inexplicability of the event is never resolved; the unseen remains unseen. The film ends quickly after Pawel's death, leaving Krzysztof and Irena suspended in a state of indecisiveness, not knowing how to react to their loss. This relative abruptness of the ending signals the impossibility of any satisfactory resolution or closure. In fact, it is the unresolved nature of the narrative that opens the film up towards the subsequent episodes and allows its epistemic uncertainty to permeate the entire series.

The ethical and epistemological irresolution of *Decalogue One* also recalls Deleuze's notion of modern cinema's "crystalline narration" and the typical characters it produces. According to Deleuze, this crystalline regime of the image becomes established with the crisis of the action-image. It is defined by situations where the characters are forced to encounter "something intolerable and unbearable [...] or too unjust [...] which henceforth outstrips [their] sensory-motor capacities."⁵⁶ For Deleuze, such encounters with the intolerable have the potential to interrogate, disrupt, and bypass entrenched habits of subjective perception and action. Deleuze's description of this potential to overcome the habitual reaffirms the Spinozan ethical interconnection between vision, knowledge, and activity: it is a matter of "grasping the intolerable [...] and thereby becoming visionary, to produce a means of knowledge and action out of pure vision."⁵⁷ However, this cinematic approach suggests an ethical method that differs somewhat from Spinoza's account: the leap to a new kind of vision is achieved not through reasoned organisation of encounters and a slow accumulation of joyful affects but rather with a singular, overpowering encounter

that effects a sudden dislocation of the coordinates of everyday existence. It is, then, precisely this dislocation caused by the intolerable or by the insistence of the unseen to become seen that creates the space for a Spinozan experimentation with the as-yet-unknown forces of the body.

According to Deleuze, crystalline narration and the presence of the intolerable in moving images give rise to a cinematic “seeing function,”⁵⁸ which inaugurates a new type of character that is not defined through action but vision. These characters become seers in situations to which they “cannot or will not react, so great is their need to ‘see’ properly what there is in the situation [...] to see the terms of a problem which is more profound than the situation, and even more pressing.”⁵⁹ In *Decalogue One*, Pawel’s death emerges as just the kind of problem that exceeds the limits of the actual situation and renders Krzysztof and Irena unable to act and make sense of it. The intolerable event even proceeds to extend its influence on situations depicted in subsequent episodes; the precarious fate of children and the corollary obligation for adults to protect them become recurring themes throughout *The Decalogue*. These themes receive their most direct expression in *Decalogue Eight* with the words of an ethics professor: “No ideal, nothing, is more important than the life of a child.” Thus, in relation to the series as a whole, Pawel’s death comes to constitute the unseen not as an instance of the transcendent but rather as an immanent genetic condition for all the ethical problems and choices that follow.

Because the intolerable event that marks the end of Pawel’s life also signals the end of the whole narrative of the film, *Decalogue One* allows no opportunity for the characters to attempt to truly apprehend or renegotiate their position regarding this intolerability. Therefore, the ending carries a tone of hopelessness, as it seems to provide no elements towards a new, adequate kind of vision and knowledge. However, the film also brings forth an alternative mode of perception, a further seer whose near-omniscience functions as a kind of counterpoint to the inadequate knowledge of Irena and Krzysztof. This “enigmatic angel-like character”⁶⁰ (Artur Barcis) constitutes a continuous mysterious presence in the series, appearing in every episode except for *Decalogue Seven* and *Decalogue Ten*. His appearances usually coincide with dramatic junctures in the narrative underlining moments of important decisions. In *Decalogue One*, the figure is repeatedly shown encamped by the lake, quietly observing the scene of the coming accident. He seems to possess a certain kind of foreknowledge of what is to come, an access to the unseen. His presence brings an air of inevitability and foreboding to the unfolding of the story: ominously, he makes eye contact with Krzysztof, who is testing the strength of the ice, and he disappears from his station after the fateful accident has taken place. Joseph G. Kickasola compares the angel-character to *Dei oculi*, “the ‘seeing’ dimension of God’s connection with the world”.⁶¹ To use Spinozan terminology, this “omnipresent perspective” could be construed as an adequate apprehension of common notions, that is, of the characteristic relations of both Pawel and the lake, as well as the laws of combination that determine the consequences of their encounter. For the angel, in other words, the breaking of the ice would conjoin naturally and unproblematically the order of true causes.

From a Spinozan point of view, every kind of perception and knowledge implies a corresponding mode of existence, as it is one’s knowing that defines the types of ideas and affects one is capable of and

thus determines a way of being in the world.⁶² In this manner, for example, an adequate kind of knowledge ties in with the full possession of one's power of acting, the endeavour to organise one's encounters favourably, and the maximising of active affects.⁶³ However, the angel's ostensibly adequate epistemic state seems to lack this parallel ethical transformation from passivity to activity as well as the deep embeddedness in one's surroundings entailed by the accumulation of affirmative relations. He remains positioned as a detached and distanced onlooker instead, wholly external to the chain of events that he observes and appears to know in advance. Thus, he is in no sense exempt from the inherent powerlessness that afflicts the characters in *Decalogue One*; even the omniscient quality of his perception proves insufficient for fulfilling the series' underlying ethical obligation of protecting the child.

In summary, *Decalogue One* can be described as consisting of an intolerable, mysterious event that belongs to the realm of the unseen and of three epistemological approaches or three modes of vision – the scientific, the religious, and the quasi-divine – which attempt to grasp that event but prove insufficient for the task. Consequently, the characters inhabiting the world of Kieślowski's *The Decalogue* appear to be eternally condemned to the state of inadequate knowledge and subject to the rule of fortuitous encounters. All in all, this world seems wholly irreconcilable with the rationalist optimism of Spinoza's ethics. Annette Insdorf extends this conclusion further to involve the cinematic medium itself: she suggests an analogy between the angel's "pure gaze" and the film camera, arguing that both are able only to "record human folly and suffering but unable to alter the course of the lives they witness."⁶⁴ In this sense, for Insdorf, the powerlessness of the characters infects also the images or, conversely, the characters' desperate existence becomes a symptom of the powerlessness of the moving image itself. By equating cinema with an inadequate kind of perception, her interpretation would imply a fundamental inability, on the part of cinema, to align with Spinozan ethics for the task of revealing the imperceptible and overcoming the habitual.

In the last section of this article, however, I will contest these propositions of an ethical impasse in *Decalogue One* in particular and for the moving image in general. I will suggest that the central ethical problem of the series, the inexplicable death of Pawel and the concomitant obligation to protect children, should not be approached only through an ethical evaluation and typology of the different modes of existence represented by the characters. Instead, I will shift the emphasis to another facet of Spinozan ethics, from typology to ethology, and propose that in *Decalogue One* the powers of the moving image itself become an important site of ethical investigation.⁶⁵ This aspect of practical experimentation with the image has been emphasised, for example, also by Emma Wilson, who argues that in Kieślowski's filmmaking "[t]he image itself – its capacities and properties – is the prime abiding concern."⁶⁶ What affects is the cinematic image capable of? What can the moving image do? These kinds of questions initiate an ethology of cinema or an immanent ethics in and of the image. In *Decalogue One*, this facet of ethical practice also takes place in the space for experimentation opened up by images of Pawel in relation to his death.

MOTION AND LIFE

In the opening sequence of the film, Irena walks along a street at night and stops, staring at a television monitor on display in a shop window. On the television screen, Pawel and a group of other school-children are running joyously down a hallway towards the camera. Later, this footage is revealed as having been shot by a local news crew that visited Pawel's school. As the children approach, the movement of the image slows down until it stops completely in a freeze-frame close-up of Pawel's face. The close-up is constituted through a double procedure of Pawel's running towards the news camera and a simultaneous zoom in towards the television monitor, focusing only on a section of its screen's surface. With this sequence of manipulation of both the television image (slow motion, freeze-frame) and the image of the image (zoom in), as well as through the interaction between the two, *Decalogue One* performs its most literal experimentation with the capacities of the moving image.

Irena becomes tearful while watching Pawel on the television screen. Her reaction reveals that this opening sequence takes place after Pawel's death, thus turning the whole story into a flashback: the loss of the child is irreversibly present from the beginning, and the images of Pawel come to represent a trace of his being; a memory that is all that remains of him. In this sense, the focus shifts on one particular capacity of the moving image: its power of preservation which can facilitate human efforts of memory. As Haltof notes, the manipulated images of Pawel assume this distinct function of remembering as they "extend our failing memory" and preserve "the smile on Pawel's face and his moment of happiness."⁶⁷ These intertwined themes of mortality and memory are also highlighted in a conversation between Pawel and Krzysztof when the latter, answering his son's questions concerning the afterlife, points to the importance of remembrance: "The memory that someone moved in a certain way, or that they were kind. You remember their face, their smile, that a tooth was missing."

The idea of the cinematic image as a vehicle of preservation is an enduring theme in the history of film theory. One of the most striking examples of this tradition can be found in André Bazin's essay "The Ontology of the Photographic Image," where he presents an interpretation of the entire history of the visual arts as an expression of the deep-rooted human need to resist mortality. In fact, Bazin traces this history all the way to the ancient Egyptians' practice of embalming, arguing that the aim of pictorial representation is to shelter the represented object from the decaying effects of the flow of time.⁶⁸ In this struggle against entropy, photography emerges as a significant turning point: through its automatic and mechanical nature, a photographic image is able to achieve more than a mere approximation of the represented object, namely a "transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction." By virtue of its production process, in other words, a photograph truly shares the being of its model and thus signals a genuinely successful preservation, liberating the model from the effects of time. Bazin illustrates the power of preservation of photographic images with the example of family albums. His description of these albums also recalls the effect created by the images of Pawel in the beginning of *Decalogue One*, as they testify to "the disturbing presence of lives halted at a set moment of their duration, freed from their

destiny.” Cinema, however, goes still further than photography in its ability to preserve the past: cinematic images are not restricted to embalming only an individual instant of time, but they are images of duration, “change mummified.”⁶⁹ Similarly, in *Decalogue One*, the function of the footage playing on the television screen is to preserve a duration, that of Pawel running down the corridor. While capturing his movement, the sequence simultaneously tends towards the immobile, using slow motion until finally arresting all movement altogether. From a Bazinian perspective, this shift from motion to rest creates an interplay between a cinematic and a photographic mode of preservation.

Bazin’s reading of the history of the visual arts amounts to a declaration of faith in the power of the moving image. Yet, when the cinematic image’s power of preservation is probed in *Decalogue One*, the tone is quite different. Already Irena’s desolate encounter with the pictorial remembrance of Pawel points to its insufficiency. Her connection to the image brings about an amplification of her remembering, but nevertheless she is left in a state of powerlessness, not being able to help Pawel, not having been able to help. There is a distance and externality to her position as she is separated from Pawel by the glass of the window and the television screen. Pawel’s presence in the image only underlies his real absence; it seems impossible that Pawel and this moving picture of him could share the same being. Irena’s positioning as external observer is very similar to that of the angel-character with his pure gaze, and this parallelism is also indicated in the film as the shots of her watching the television screen are juxtaposed with shots of him sitting by the fire looking straight at the camera. However, their perceptions acquire different hues: the latter is an issue of foreknowledge, the former one of hindsight.

In Spinoza’s philosophy, the affirmations of life are accompanied by a devaluation and demystification of death: death is “irreducibly external,” nothing more than “an inevitable *bad encounter* in the order of natural existences.”⁷⁰ It is an encounter between two incompatible bodies whereby the realization of one’s characteristic relation is halted.⁷¹ Because such occurrences are entirely external and belong to the realm of sad passions, death should not concern adequate understanding in the least, as “wisdom is a meditation of life, not of death.”⁷² Yet, under habitual, inadequate conditions of thinking, human beings tend to carry death within, misperceive it as internal, and lead a life fixated on it.⁷³

While Spinoza and Bazin share the idea that preoccupation with death constitutes a natural condition for human beings, their conclusions concerning this matter diverge. For Bazin, it is an inescapable part of our psychological makeup, consequently suffusing the history of visual art as well, whereas for Spinoza it is a misperception that will be rectified by an ethics of joy. From a Spinozan perspective, then, the power of preservation of the moving image functions simply as the reproduction of a false appearance, tying cinema to the same inadequate preconditions that limit human epistemology in its natural state. Irena’s experience with the footage of Pawel playing on television in the shop window appears to corroborate the inadequacy of this idea and ideal of preservation.

However, it is possible to analyse the manipulation of the images of Pawel in a different light; there is a second aspect, besides memory and preservation, to the ethological experimentation in *Decalogue One*. This other aspect, too, is expressed in Krzysztof’s answer to his son’s inquiries about the afterlife,

when he describes death as a phenomenon of motion and stasis: “The heart stops pumping blood. It doesn’t reach the brain, movement ceases, everything stops. It’s the end.” In *Decalogue One*, this account of the movements of the body is transposed to the image itself: it refers not just to a physical, bodily determination but works also as a description of cinema and the moving image as a composition of differential relations of motion and rest. The film’s overt experimentation with movement and stasis is established instantly in its first shot. It is a close-up of the surface of the lake, where two separate elements bisect the image: the solid immobility of ice on the left and the flowing movement of water on the right. Notably, this interplay of motion and rest occurs at the precise location of Pawel’s death: as long as death is defined through movement and stasis, it becomes an inherently cinematic effect. Importantly, the composition of relations of motion and rest is understood here as a power immanent to the cinematic image and, unlike preservation, not as reducible to pre-defined human categories and needs.

Because Pawel dies out-of-frame, the arresting of his movement in the freeze-frame becomes the visible form of his death within the film. But if death is movement ceasing, then the power of the moving image, in relation to death, is not that of preservation but rather reanimation. In the final scene of *Decalogue One*, the frozen close-up of Pawel, which ended the sequence in the beginning of the film, returns. This time the image goes through a few distinct, tentative jolts before gaining motion again. The repetition of the television images in the beginning and end of *Decalogue One* encloses the whole film in a development from movement to stasis to movement again. The final gesture of the film is thus a reanimation, a shift from immobility to motion, from death to life. This procedure is the polar opposite of the narrative which ends in the loss of life.

In the final shot, Pawel draws so close to the camera that he transforms into an abstract, blurry, and granular mass of grey and white in motion. In this sense, the regained movement and life is no longer tied to a pre-formed personality but becomes a kind of pre-subjective force of becoming, thus initiating a cinematic renegotiation of the concepts of life and death. The questioning of the common-sense limits of a life through different repetitions and variations is a recurring theme throughout Kieślowski’s filmmaking. This has been emphasised also by Wilson, who notes: “For Kieślowski [...] the privilege of narrative cinema is in its potential to visualize parallel destinies, to actualize so many virtual existences.”⁷⁴ In *Decalogue One*, however, this remapping of life does not take place primarily in relation to the narrative but through an ethological experimentation with the moving image itself: it constitutes an affirmation of the power of the image that redeems the powerlessness of the characters.

According to Deleuze, in modern cinema, the encounter with the intolerable does not give way to a new kind of vision and activity, to new powers and dimensions in the image, until one knows “how to extract from the event the part that cannot be reduced to what happens: that part of inexhaustible possibility that constitutes the unbearable, the intolerable, the visionary’s part.”⁷⁵ In an ethical consideration of cinema, the starting point must be that we do not yet know what the moving image is capable of. In this respect, the hopelessness of Krzysztof and Irena does not exhaust all the possibilities in the film. The final shot, the reanimation of Pawel, is an expression of faith beyond their perspectives. It is

not only a preparation for the ethics professor's appeal to the importance of the lives of children in general but an assertion of the significance of Pawel's life in particular. It fashions a cinematic faith, beyond reason, that this child is not yet lost.

¹ William Bartley, "Faith, Doubt, and Chiasmus in Krzysztof Kieslowski's Decalogue I," *Journal of Religion and Film* 18, no. 2 (October 2014): 1–2.

² Paul Coates, "Introduction," in *Lucid Dreams: The Films of Krzysztof Kieślowski*, ed. Coates (Trowbridge: Flicks Books, 1999), 7.

³ See, for instance, *ibid.*, 10; Marek Haltof, *The Cinema of Krzysztof Kieślowski: Variations on Destiny and Chance* (London: Wallflower Press, 2004), 78; Paul C. Santilli, "Cinema and Subjectivity in Krzysztof Kieślowski," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 149.

⁴ Eva Badowska and Francesca Parmeggiani "Introduction: 'Within unrest, there is always a question,'" eds. Badowska and Parmeggiani, *Of Elephants and Toothaches: Ethics, Politics, and Religion in Krzysztof Kieślowski's Decalogue*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 6.

⁵ Joseph G. Kickasola, *The Films of Krzysztof Kieślowski: The Liminal Image* (New York: Continuum, 2004), 161–162.

⁶ Annette Insdorf, *Double Lives, Second Chances: The Cinema of Krzysztof Kieslowski* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013), 71.

⁷ Kickasola, *The Liminal Image*, 162.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 23.

⁹ Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 25–26.

¹⁰ Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 73–74.

¹¹ Spinoza defines bodies as finite particulars that are modifications of a single substance. For more on this concept of the body, see, for example, Jonathan Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1984), 92–96.

¹² Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley, *Spinoza: Complete Works*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), Part III, Post. 1, 278.

¹³ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part IV, Prop. 38, 341–342; Prop. 41, 343.

¹⁴ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 27.

¹⁵ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Prop. 11 Schol., 284–285.

¹⁶ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Def. 3, 278.

¹⁷ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 19.

¹⁸ See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 34, 263–264.

¹⁹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 7, 247.

²⁰ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 19, 73–75.

²¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 29 Cor., 262.

²² Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 40 Schol. 2, 267.

²³ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Prop. 1, 279.

²⁴ An idea of an affection represents a momentary state of the affected body, but in this momentariness there is always implicated a passage to a greater or lesser power of acting in comparison to the preceding state. These passages or affects are inseparable from ideas as they attach the current state of the body to its preceding state and make it tend towards the next one. This indicates that there is a certain kind of causal relation between ideas and affects. See Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 48–49.

²⁵ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 27–28, 76.

²⁶ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 56.

²⁷ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 18.

²⁸ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 261–262.

²⁹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 29 Schol., 262.

³⁰ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 72.

³¹ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 54.

³² See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 37–39, 265–266.

³³ For more on the distinction between essence and characteristic relation, see Deleuze, *Expressionism*, 209–212.

³⁴ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 22.

³⁵ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 40 Schol. 2, 267.

- ³⁶ Deleuze, *Expressionism*, 273–274.
- ³⁷ See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Prop. 2 Schol., 280–281.
- ³⁸ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 125.
- ³⁹ Deleuze, *Expressionism*, 282–283.
- ⁴⁰ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 56.
- ⁴¹ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 10.
- ⁴² Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 13.
- ⁴³ See Insdorf, *Double Lives, Second Chances*, 15–16.
- ⁴⁴ Spinoza also distinguishes a third kind of knowledge that he calls “intuition.” *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 40 Schol. 2, 267. If the second kind of knowledge refers to characteristic relations in which essences express themselves, it is only the third kind that captures eternal essences in themselves. Thus, the active joys of the third kind differ from their counterparts of the second kind by deriving “absolutely from our essence” and not having to find their “occasional causes in passive affections of joy.” Deleuze, *Expressionism*, 303–304, 307–308. In this paper, I will consider only the first two kinds of knowledge because they encompass the leap from morality to ethics and, thus, the proposed alignment between Spinoza and Kieślowski. Nevertheless, it can be noted that the difference between the second kind and the third kind of knowledge involves a conversion from the relative to the absolute, that is, from particular affections and affects to an essence that “surveys its affects and affections in eternity.” Deleuze, “Spinoza and the Three ‘Ethics,’” in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), 148–149. In relation to ethics, this absolute and eternal survey means that true activity ceases to be “the ultimate end” and becomes instead “the first foundation” of ethics, instigating “the language of pure potency or virtue.” Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 72. Consequently, a tentative parallel could be drawn between Spinoza’s theory of the third kind of knowledge and William Jaworski’s interpretation of *The Decalogue* from the point of view of virtue-based ethics. See Jaworski, “Rules and Virtues: The Moral Insight of *The Decalogue*,” in *Of Elephants and Toothaches*, 15–29.
- ⁴⁵ Spinoza, *A Theologico-Political Treatise*, in *Spinoza: Complete Works*, 430.
- ⁴⁶ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 22–23.
- ⁴⁷ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part IV, Def. 1 and 2, 322; Prop. 41 Proof, 343.
- ⁴⁸ Spinoza, *A Theologico-Political Treatise*, 430–431.
- ⁴⁹ Tadeusz Sobolewski, “Ultimate Concerns,” trans. Coates, in *Lucid Dreams*, 27–28.
- ⁵⁰ Eddy Troy, “Deleuze and Kieślowski: On the Cinema of Exhaustion,” *Film-Philosophy* 21, no.1 (February 2017): 56.
- ⁵¹ Coates, “The Curse of the Law: *The Decalogue*,” in *Lucid Dreams*, 95.
- ⁵² Exod. 20:3 (New Revised Standard Version).
- ⁵³ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 25–26.
- ⁵⁴ Mirosław Przyłipiak, “*Dekalog / The Decalogue*,” ed. Peter Hames, *The Cinema of Central Europe*, (London: Wallflower Press, 2004), 233–234.
- ⁵⁵ Emma Wilson, *Memory and Survival: The French Cinema of Krzysztof Kieślowski* (Oxford: Legenda, 2000), 96.
- ⁵⁶ Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 18.
- ⁵⁷ Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 18.
- ⁵⁸ Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 19.
- ⁵⁹ Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 128.
- ⁶⁰ Haltof, *Variations on Destiny and Chance*, 81.
- ⁶¹ Kickasola, *The Liminal Image*, 164–165.
- ⁶² See Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 82.
- ⁶³ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 103.
- ⁶⁴ Insdorf, *Double Lives, Second Chances*, 73.
- ⁶⁵ Similarly, for Deleuze, the intolerable cannot be reduced simply to a narrative device or a related character type: these are rather just surface effects or indirect products of different compositions of relations of time and motion in the cinematic image. *Negotiations: 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 59. Thus, the intolerable can be thought of as an internal capacity of the moving image in itself where “something has become too strong in the image.” Simultaneously, the process towards a new kind of vision and knowledge, which takes place in relation to this intolerability, becomes an experimentation with the powers of the image itself and a growth in its dimensions. See Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 18, 22.
- ⁶⁶ Wilson, *Memory and Survival*, 3.
- ⁶⁷ Haltof, *Variations on Destiny and Chance*, 83.
- ⁶⁸ André Bazin, *What is Cinema? Volume 1*, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 9–10.

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- ⁶⁹ Bazin, *What is Cinema?*, 14–15.
⁷⁰ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 12–13.
⁷¹ See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part IV, Prop. 39 Schol., 342.
⁷² Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part IV, Prop. 67, 355.
⁷³ Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, 42.
⁷⁴ Wilson, *Memory and Survival*, 99.
⁷⁵ Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 19–20.