

TIME, GRIEF, AND GRACE: A BACHELARDIAN INTERPRETATION OF NORA'S JOURNEY

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According to Edward Casey, philosophers have been preoccupied with a central question concerning time; namely, “is time continuous, or is it disruptive?”¹ The answer to this question also determines one’s attitude toward a host of related topics, including grief. The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard argued for the latter, claiming that “time is a reality confined to the instant and suspended between two voids.”² Bachelard utilizes dialectical language to juxtapose the existence of the present instant and the nonexistence of the past and future. The implication here is that the time of our life does not exist along some uninterrupted medium. Rather, every moment is separate and distinct from the next. Time, within the context of Bachelard’s philosophy, is inherently discontinuous. The benefit of such an approach, with respect to grief, is that it brings to the forefront the reality and persistence of bereavement throughout the individual’s life. As Line Ryberg Ingerslev explains, there has been a tendency to view grief as “a process with the specific aim,” rather than “an ongoing activity.”³ The deficiency of such an approach is that it fails to account for the fact that grief is often a non-linear activity for the individual. Nevertheless, in grief, Bachelard sees an opportunity for grace. Bachelard strips grace of its theological context, and instead instantiates it in the human ability “to rectify, diversify, and go beyond their own nature.”⁴ This paper will explore the relationship between time, grief, and grace through the lens of Nora’s character in the show *The Leftovers*. Nora (Carrie Coon) stands out because of her loss, and the depiction of her grief, but also because she attains some sort of redemption in the end. Although the method by which she obtains such redemption is left vague, as it often is in life, Bachelard’s concept of grace will shed some light on this development.

BACHELARD ON TIME

Much can be said about Bachelard’s philosophy of time,⁵ but for the purposes of this paper, three characteristics stand out:

1. Its discontinuous nature
2. Its relational/constructive quality
3. And the rhythm of experienced time (Rhythmanalysis)

In his *The Dialectic of Duration (DD)*, Bachelard defines time as “a series of breaks.”⁶ This is, of course, contrary to the view that time “flows” seamlessly from the past to the future. Bachelard argues that the “thread of time has knots all along it.”⁷ These “breaks” or “knots” are a metaphorical reference to temporal causality; specifically, this imagery is utilized to call attention to the fact that temporal causality, at its most basic level, is discontinuous.

While Bachelard pictures time as a series of “breaks,” we are still left with the question, “Breaks between what?” The answer comes in the form of the “instant.” In his *Intuition of the Instant (II)* Bachelard posits that “Time has but one reality, the reality of the instant.”⁸ The instant is the “most real” or “foundational” element of time, because it is the only moment that we are consciously aware of, or in which we are present. As Zbigniew Kotowicz summarizes, “the instant is the first reality of time, it is time’s only reality and is therefore where the meditation on temporal phenomenon must begin.”⁹ Bachelard explains that each instant exists in isolation or “solitude.” These isolated instances may be said to exist independently from one another insofar as they are not necessarily connected causally. While we may list an “objective” order of events, event A happened *before* event B, this does not necessitate a formal cause which flows through those events: that event A *caused* event B. The cause, as a result, is something which emerges from a rational agent’s ordering of a sequence of events but not contained within the events themselves. Bachelard speaks to this point by insisting that “the realization of the cause in order to give its effect is therefore an emergence, a composition.”¹⁰ Nevertheless, although these instances exist in isolation they also, to borrow an expression from Carlo Rovelli, exist in a larger “web of relations.”¹¹ In other words, these isolated instances never keep to themselves. Instead, they connect to form larger temporal durations which exist in relation to other instances. The impression of time that the individual constructs mentally is formulated by linking instances together. In this respect, Bachelard explains in his *DD* that “the past can only be brought back to life by linking it firmly to an affective theme that is necessarily present.”¹² Any sense of temporal duration is psychologically constructed from previously experienced instances (the past) or anticipated instances (the future). As Bachelard explains in his *II*, duration is a “relative and secondary datum, always more or less artificial.”¹³

Time is discontinuous because its most basic reality, the instant, is isolated and disconnected from other instances. At the same time, however, each one of these instances may be placed in relation to another instant. As a result, the reader is presented with the rather paradoxical position that “every instant is at once a giver and a plunderer” and that “a new era always opens up through the irruption of an absolute.”¹⁴ The important point here, to quote Monika Wulz, is that the “possibilities of reality are enclosed in isolated instances or in isolated points.”¹⁵ Possibility, action, and creation spring forth from the fact that there is no causality inherent in temporal relations. The individual becomes, at the same time, beholden to their past and yet radically free from it. Humans exist within a “dialectical osculation of making and annihilating,”¹⁶ that is to say we contain within ourselves the potential to construct our past while simultaneously containing the ability to destroy or depart from

our past. The power of the instant lies in its potentiality. It is the potential for action, novelty, and change.

A prominent feature of Bachelard's philosophy of time is the seamless interweaving of metaphysical discussions about the nature of time and the lived experience of time. Bachelard likes to talk about the "lived experience of time" in terms of rhythm, and the analysis of this rhythm as rhythmanalysis. There is a direct link between the experience of the instant and consciousness insofar as the instant is the temporal location of conscious action. "The fundamental nature of rhythm," according to Bachelard, "is clearly shown by this possibility of their being a purely temporal explosion."¹⁷ The "temporal explosion" mentioned in the previous quote is the potentiality that the instant brings. It is through the construction of duration that Bachelard believes we can reach "real time." Real time, in this sense, refers to those durations which are "lived, felt, loved, sung, and written about in literature."¹⁸ Due to the nature of duration, it is possible for an individual to experience time in different ways. Just as a piece of music may sound "fast" or "slow" depending upon the rhythm of the song, so life may seem at times to be moving "fast" or "slow." The musician strings individual notes together, which the listener interprets as a rhythm/melody. The same is true of the individual who strings together various instances, which subsequently take on the appearance of duration. In both cases, one may break down a particular segment of time or music into individual instances or notes. Rhythmanalysis, therefore, consists of analyzing the "movement" of one's life, or how we are perceive the progress of time.

A CASE STUDY: NORA DURST

Leaving Bachelard aside for a moment, it will be pertinent to the remainder of the discussion to examine the character of Nora Durst and the philosophical problems raised by her story. Of principle concern is the emotional, philosophical, and temporal impact of Nora's grief. From a cinematic standpoint, *The Leftovers* captures what Saige Walton has referred to as the "durational thickness" of Nora's grief portrayed in the narrative and visual representation of her character.¹⁹ While the viewer is only given glimpses into the moment when Nora lost her children and husband, they are, on the other hand, shown her prolonged struggle with grief. As Walton points out, in cinematic depictions of grief the focus becomes on how "the living will continue to carry the dead (in memory, through emotion, or through creative production)."²⁰ The following analysis will center largely on the first season of *The Leftovers* and the ways in which characters, especially Nora, are depicted dealing with their grief.

The viewer is introduced to Nora in the first episode of the first season when she is invited to the "Hero's Day" parade to give a speech to honor those who departed. Here we learn that in the Sudden Departure, Nora lost her two children and her husband. Although the Heroes Day parade takes place three years after the Sudden Departure, the show makes clear that for most people, Nora included, the inexplicability of the event has prevented the normal grieving process. As Kevin (Justin Theroux)

explains to Mapleton's mayor (Amanda Warren), in preparation for the event (S1E1), "nobody is ready to feel better, they are ready to fucking explode." Nora expresses a similar sentiment in the closing lines of her speech, "I'm not greedy. I'm not asking for that perfect day at the beach. Just give me that horrible Saturday. All four of us sick and miserable, but alive and together." If we can map Nora's sentiments onto the Kübler-Ross model of the grief cycle, there are elements of anger, bargaining, and depression, but there is not an expression of closure or acceptance. In fact, this is a fundamental element of Nora's character that we will see displayed throughout the show; specifically, there is an underlying resistance to the acceptance of the trauma experienced. Furthermore, even if a semblance of "moving on" is expressed in her character, it is only temporary.

Speaking to Nora's situation specifically, the Kübler-Ross model proves to be ill-equipped to handle the sort of grief that is depicted, at least with respect to the philosophical dimensions of grief.²¹ In order to highlight some of the characteristics of grief that pertain to this paper, it will be beneficial to narrow the scope. That being said, the sixth episode of the first season, "Guest" (S1E6), provides explicit insight into some of the ideas discussed in this paper.

Toward the beginning of the episode, Nora is shown grocery shopping and subsequently cleaning out her refrigerator in order to make room for her newly purchased food. The ordinariness of such an act is inverted once the viewer realizes that she is restocking her home with the same foodstuffs that were present at the time of her family's departure. The peculiarity of her habits become excruciatingly painful to watch upon the further realization that the physical makeup of her home, down to the used-up roll of paper towels that has yet to be discarded, has remained undisturbed since her children were taken. This portrayal of Nora's grief speaks to what Matthew Ratcliffe identifies as the presence of "absence" in the phenomenological impact that grief has on our "habitual world."²² Ratcliffe explains that although the loss of a loved one occurred in the past, there are still ways in which this loss can be experienced in the present moment.

Going back to Nora's situation, she exists in a "habituated world," a world that was once inhabited by people who acted and behaved in certain ways. This world, of course, did not disappear with the loss of her family, but rather, continued to persist after their departure. As Ratcliffe explains, this paradoxical present-absence "involves continuing to experience one's surroundings in ways that presuppose certain capacities."²³ In other words, Nora inhabited a habitual world that included a very dynamic family life. Although the members of that family are now removed from that world, she is not, and therefore continues to feel their presence in the habitual aspects of her life. Nora continues to persist in a state in which coping with her grief becomes an impossibility because the loss of her family is not "past," but rather a present experience that she continues to live out daily.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his *Phenomenology of Perception*, claimed that "the passage of time does not carry away impossible projects, nor does it seal off the traumatic experience. The subject still remains open to the same impossible future, if not in his explicit thoughts then at least in his actual being."²⁴ Bachelard, in his *II*, makes a similar claim when he says: "For the person who continues to

love, a lost love is both present and past—present for the faithful heart, past for the unhappy heart.”²⁵ These sentiments represent an explicit rejection of the commonly held platitude that “time heals all wounds.” The assumption, implicit within the platitude, is that past trauma may be softened with the passage of time. Going even deeper one may assume a posited disconnect between past and present. Nora’s character, of course, embodies an inherent rejection of such platitudes. Instead, what we have represented here, articulated by William Faulkner, is a different sentiment that holds that “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”²⁶

Nora herself expresses a similar sentiment while she is at a work-related conference (S1E6). While there, she meets Patrick Johansen (Curtiss Cook), an author who has just written a book titled *What’s Next*. Although the viewer does not know the content of the book itself, we may assume, due to the title and the author’s seemingly “happy” demeanor, that the book deals with life after loss, or how to move on from loss. The inherent absurdity of such a position disgusts Nora to the point of triggering a violent outburst:

NORA: If you were in pain you would know there is no moving on. There is no happiness. What’s next? What’s fucking next? Nothing is next. Nothing. (S1E6)

Nora’s sentiments, although expressed in the form of an emotional outburst, claw at a foundational philosophical problem that lies at the heart of our experience of grief; namely, is it possible for the individual to find meaning in the wake of such loss? Such an experience constitutes what Marilyn McCord Adams and Stewart Sutherland define as a “horrendous evil.” A defining characteristic of a horrendous evil, according to Adams and Sutherland, is that it “threatens to rob a person’s life of positive meaning” and subsequently carry with it the requisite “not only to be engulfed, but to be made meaningful through positive and decisive defeat.”²⁷

Philosophically speaking, it seems that we have reached a bit of an impasse. Nora’s situation, although a work of fiction, speaks to one of the most basic and universal features of the human condition: The experience of pain, death, and loss. Likewise, from this experience, we get one of the most primordial questions of philosophy: How does, or can, the individual ascribe positive meaning to their lives in the face of such tragedy? *The Leftovers*, I think, offers two general approaches, and one specific to Nora, which seek to answer this question, all of which are presented in the first season and play out over the course of the series.

The first approach is a bit of a non-answer, and it comes in the form of nihilism. After requesting a divorce, in her letter to Kevin, Lorie (Amy Brenneman) gives us some insight into the motivations of her character (S1E4): “I think I’m supposed to stay broken. Maybe we all are.” The answer here is that there is no answer. The departure represents an event that is inherently absurd and devoid of meaning. As a result, no meaning or answers can be posited to “justify” or “redeem” the individual’s experience. In many respects, the Guilty Remnant, the group which Lorie leaves Kevin to join, embodies this idea. Their slogan, “We are living reminders,” is intended to call attention to the fact

that people are continuing with their lives in the wake of an event that destroyed standard narratives of meaning. Their existence, their purpose, is to remind people that they are living a lie.

The second approach to the problem of suffering and meaning comes in the form of a religious answer. Of course, this approach is best embodied by the character of Matt (Christopher Eccleston), Nora's brother, who is the preacher in the series. The third episode of season one starts off with a sermon by Matt about a little boy who has been diagnosed with cancer. Matt ends the sermon with a series of questions:

MATT: The boy survives, now she has a choice to make. Does he decide that he was punished, or that he was rewarded? Will he be angry for having been made to suffer, or will he be grateful for that suffering because it changed him? (S1E3)

As the episode unfolds, we see Matt live out the answer to these questions as he views the challenges he faces as obstacles put in place by God. In this sense, the suffering that one experiences is inherently meaningful simply due to the fact that it is purposeful, intended for the individual by a higher power. Matt's exact words to Nora, that the departure "was a test" (S1E3), implicitly assumes that there is some sort of reason behind the events. Although those reasons might remain unclear to the one who suffers through them, the individual may nevertheless be content in the knowledge that what happened occurred for the sake of a plan greater than themselves.

While it may be argued that Nora oscillates between these two positions throughout the course of the series, her character ultimately represents a rejection of both. Yet, the answer that Nora's character finds remains a bit obtuse to the viewer because of its seemingly ambiguous nature. While Nora's character certainly demonstrates nihilistic characteristics, she ultimately overcomes or accepts her grief in a way that is inconsistent with nihilism as such. Furthermore, while we do see Nora venture into religious territory, expressed in her character's decision to put faith into uncertain people/machines, such as her encounter with Holy Wayne (Paterson Joseph) or her entrance into the machine in the final season, the viewer is left with an ultimate rejection of outside solutions. Rather, the peace she obtains is a direct result of internal processes and not the work of an external supernatural agent.

TIME AND GRACE

Nora's character raises some complex questions regarding how individuals make sense of grief and tragedy. Nevertheless, if we consider Nora's narrative within the context of Bachelard's philosophy of time, then the process of Nora's journey becomes contextualized and explicable. The key point here lies in Bachelard's explanation of the instant. According to Bachelard, the instant occurs at the intersection of "this place" and "this moment." Simply put, the instant is the moment of time that we are cognitively aware of, to a lesser or greater extent, and the "moment" that grounds us as conscious entities. Bachelard argues that "life always finds its primary reality in the instant."²⁸ The primary

reality of the lived experience persists in the instant rather than duration, which Bachelard claims has no ontological status. As outlined in the first section, duration is a “construction,” which is built from the relations between instances. In this respect, there is a deep analogy that may be drawn between the construction of duration from instances and the composition of music. Just as musicians develop a specific rhythm for a song, so human beings construct a rhythm (duration) out of instances. The same sort of work is present in both situations. The musician strings individual notes together, which the listener interprets as a rhythm/melody. Despite its instrumental composition, or its rhythm, when we hear a song we think of it as a “whole,” or as a duration.

The above analogy is critical to Bachelard’s philosophy of time and, for the purposes of this paper, the rest of this argument hinges on this particular understanding of the instant. In order for the instant to be realized, one must act on or within the instant. That is to say, the individual must be aware/conscious of the instant. Consequently, the essence of the instant consists in the act of becoming.²⁹ These acts, within history, are discontinuous insofar as each new act is a separate occurrence, breaking with the past and beginning anew. The “realizing” and “acting” in the instant leads Bachelard to distinguish between two sorts of experienced time: horizontal and vertical time. Horizontal time is “ordinary” time, the time that arises from the concrete order of events. Bachelard goes on to clarify that horizontal time is “the flux and development of other people, of life, and of the world.”³⁰ What has been described above is not horizontal but “vertical” time, the seat of action, which Bachelard describes as “passionate,” “active,” and “dynamic.”³¹ With respect to the “rhythm” of time, the consistency of horizontal times provides a baseline for the experience of time, the feeling of the “movement” of time. Vertical time, on the other hand, is “the experience of a certain rupture of being” in which “the idea of discontinuity imposes itself without dispute.”³²

When discussing the instant and vertical time Bachelard’s language borders on the religious: love, hope, harmony, redemption, and transcendence are all used to describe this unique form of time. This shift in language may alarm some readers of Bachelard, who in his previous work on epistemology and time generally avoided such a leap, and naturally raises the question: Why invoke theological/religious language within the context of an a-theological philosophical treatises on time? To be clear grace, theological or otherwise, is not a concept that is developed in the secondary literature surrounding Bachelard’s corpus. The closest approximation to grace that is provided is Mary McAllester Jones’ concept of the “redemptive instant.”³³ Redemption here is associated with the “newness” brought about by the instant. Jones explains that this redemption “is associated with healing” because it is with the experience of vertical time that “the scales fall from our eyes” and “we are surprised.”³⁴ Jones emphasizes the epistemological point Bachelard makes, and the salvific quality on display is the recognition of error and the acknowledgment of previous lapses in reasoning. Pivoting away from Jones, there is still much to be explored if a similar concept of grace is applied to Bachelard; specifically, the ways in which this temporal grace can be applied to the individuals understanding of their life.

The concept of grace within the Christian tradition has a long history dating back, in its most robust presentation, to the works of Saint Augustine. One of the chief characteristics of Augustine's understanding of grace is its ability to liberate the individual. To use the words of Alister McGrath, "grace is understood as a liberating force, which sets human nature free from its self-incurred bondage to sin."³⁵ Of course, Bachelard's writing does not posit the sort of theological substratum necessary to sustain a concept like "sin." Nevertheless, Bachelard is deliberate in his choosing to utilize a theologically loaded term such as "grace." The rationale for this choice seems to lie in the "liberating" characteristic of grace. Within the context of the Christian New Testament it is "by Grace you have been saved."³⁶ That is to say, the individual who was once dead in sin has been rescued from their plight by God and given a new life. Grace, then, introduces a transforming force that radically alters the course of the individual's life. The instant, according to Bachelard, carries with it the potential for the same sort of existential impact on the individual insofar as the instant contains within it the possibility of change.

The full force of the philosophical implications of the instant are brought to bear on the individual when considering the relationship between vertical time and the individual's past. Toward the end of his *II*, Bachelard explains that "what coordinates the world is not the force of the past."³⁷ In other words, there is no pre-established cause or harmony which has "led" the universe to where it is now. Whatever cause the individual identifies is one which is constructed through reason and imposed on the past. Gerald Edelman qualifies "the present" as the "remembered present."³⁸ Edelman goes on to explain that the subjective experience of consciousness is rooted in the integration of the individual's past into the present moment. The act of remembering incorporates a sort of reintegration and construction of these fragments which subsequently combines them into a recognizable whole. Hinton Ladson explains that remembrance is the act of "continually recreating the past."³⁹ Memories, as Ladson explains, "can never be recovered in an unmodified form within the constraints of the present."⁴⁰ Rather, the act of remembrance itself oftentimes shapes and recreates the past. The individual's past becomes something which is malleable and something which, to use the words of Jessica Wiskus, is "worked by the human imagination."⁴¹ Events which are not sequentially linked may become so as memories are "folded" onto one another. Not only then is the past malleable, but it is also something which contains "possibility."

The upshot to Bachelard's understanding of time, within the context of the individual's life, is that the past no longer has dominion over the present or the future. The inherent discontinuity of time means that there is an insurmountable gulf that exists between our past and the present moment. This gulf can be bridged, of course, but we must recognize that the bridging is in large part a result of an imposition of reason and causality that does not have an ontological basis. The result is a sort of temporal grace bestowed upon the present moment which offers the potential for a radically new life, one that could be categorically different from the past. Jean Lescurer wonderfully expresses this idea in his "Introduction to Bachelard's Poetics" when he states that:

“For never— not for a single moment— are we the sum of our past. Each instant discovered is what grants new sense, at every instant, to the senseless history we have lived so far. It is what grants our effort some of the meaning we need in order to seize the soul that shall be ours.”⁴²

NORA’S GRIEF, TEMPORAL GRACE, AND RHYTHMANALYSIS

It is within this context that we can best understand Nora’s journey. While some of Nora’s behaviors may be understood as nihilistic, her character ultimately embodies a rejection of nihilism in the decisions that she makes to embrace hope and love in the wake of her personal tragedy. Nevertheless, throughout the series we also see her character explicitly reject the sort of religious answer embodied by her brother Matt. Nora’s character seems to suggest a third possibility, one that is also hinted at by Bachelard. The presentation of this answer is best exemplified in the final moments of the episode mentioned above (S1E6).

After her encounter with Patrick, Nora is approached at the conference by a man who claims that he can get rid of her pain. At this point Nora is introduced to Holy Wayne who, quoting Ecclesiastes 9:4, offers some words of wisdom which seem to echo the words of Lescure:

HOLY WAYNE: For whoever is joined with all the living there is hope. Surely a live dog is better than a dead lion. Hope is your weakness, you want it gone because you don’t deserve it.
(S1E6)

The scene ends with Nora weeping while embracing Wayne. The impact of the encounter is, however, best depicted in the scenes which follow. Here Nora’s actions stand in stark contrast to those which were shown at the beginning of the episode. Now, she no longer feels the need to watch the schoolteacher with whom her husband had an affair. She no longer feels the need to stock her house with the food that her children would have eaten, the food that was present on the day of their departure. Finally, she is shown opening herself up to Kevin and inviting the possibility of a romantic relationship.

Reflecting on Nora’s encounter with Holy Wayne one is left with the Bachelardian question: “Can one instant be so rich, so vivid?”⁴³ To this question Bachelard gives a qualified “yes,” insofar as such an instant contains the potential to signify “the motivating force of a person.”⁴⁴ The encounter with Holy Wayne allows Nora’s character to pivot and reframe her relationship with her past. Returning to Bachelard’s usage of grace, he refers to such moments as the “grace of encounter.”⁴⁵ Nora, on her own, was unable to break the tethers of pain which bound her to her past. That is to say, in her solitude she was incapable of imagining the new possibilities of a future without her family. Wayne’s invitation to “hope” constructs the possibility of a new future out of the pernicious past which once enslaved Nora’s character. As Bachelard explains, “we live asleep in a sleeping world”⁴⁶ until the instant arouses us from our slumber.

In reference to the shows depiction of Nora's everyday actions, it is possible to see how the *rhythm* of her life change after the encounter with Holy Wayne. Henri Lefebvre defines rhythm as "the interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy."⁴⁷ While generally applicable to what has been outlined, Bachelard's understanding of time changes the meaning of the term as it is used. Rhythmanalysis, or the analyzing of life's rhythms, for Bachelard is focused on the way "thought time" prevails, orders, or shapes "lived time."⁴⁸ Although the concept of "rhythm" typically carries with it a sense of pattern or repetition, temporal rhythm for Bachelard is more malleable and sometimes even disruptive. This may cause, within the context of film, what Saige Walton calls "felt discordance."⁴⁹ Bachelard's philosophy of time allows us to account for non-harmonic rhythms in film and, if Bachelard is to be believed, life. Nora's character embodies this concept. Applying Rhythmanalysis to Nora in the first part of the episode reveals a woman held captive by her own grief. In every scene the viewer is made painfully aware of the absence of her family. Nevertheless, the encounter with holy Wayne marks a primal shift in the tone of the episode itself and in the rhythm of Nora's character. Her previous rhythm was not only disrupted, but radically altered at a foundational level.

It is difficult to say what exactly happened in the moment with Holy Wayne. *The Leftovers* often leaves religious or miraculous events obscure and open-ended to the viewer. What we can say, however, is that Nora's relationship to her past was fundamentally altered. While it may be difficult to explain such a change, Bachelard's philosophy of time provides us with the philosophical language to imagine possible explanations.

¹ Edward Casey, "The Difference an Instant Makes: Bachelard's Brilliant Breakthrough," in *Adventures in Phenomenology: Gaston Bachelard* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2017), 19.

² Gaston Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, trans. Eileen Rizo-Patron (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013), 6.

³ Line Ryberg Ingerslev, "Ongoing: On grief's Open-Ended Rehearsal," *Continental Philosophy Review* 51, no. 3 (2018): 344.

⁴ Gaston Bachelard, *Le Materialisme Rationnel* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), 1-2.

⁵ Bachelard's two works on time are *Intuition of the Instant* and *The Dialectic of Duration*, trans. Mary McAllester Jones (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2000).

⁶ Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, 41.

⁷ Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, 71.

⁸ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 6.

⁹ Zibgniew Kotowicz, *Gaston Bachelard: A Philosophy of the Surreal* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 172.

¹⁰ Bachelard, *The Dialect of Duration*, 62.

¹¹ Carlo Rovelli, *Reality is not what it Seems: The Journey to Quantum Gravity* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2014), 113.

¹² Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, 40.

¹³ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 11.

¹⁴ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 8 and 10.

¹⁵ Monika Wulz, "Intervals, possibilities and encounters: The trigger of a ruptured history in Bachelard," in *Conference History and Epistemology. From Bachelard and Canguilhem to Today's History of Science*, ed. Henning Schmidgen Berlin (2012): 78.

¹⁶ Gaston Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 46.

¹⁷ Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, 124.

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- ¹⁸ Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, 109.
- ¹⁹ Saige Walton, "Loving and Grieving with *Heart of a Dog* and Merleau-Ponty's Depth," *Projections* 13, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 49.
- ²⁰ Walton, "Loving and Grieving with *Heart of a Dog* and Merleau-Ponty's Depth," 50.
- ²¹ This may point to deeper inadequacies of the model in general, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. See for example: Charles A. Corr, "The 'five stages' in coping with dying and bereavement: strengths, weaknesses and some alternatives," *Mortality* 24 (2019): 405-417.
- ²² Matthew Ratcliffe, "Towards a phenomenology of grief: Insights from Merleau-Ponty," *European Journal of Philosophy* 28, no.3 (2020): 657- 669.
- ²³ Ratcliffe, "Towards a phenomenology of grief," 658.
- ²⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. D. Landes (London: Routledge Press, 2012), 85.
- ²⁵ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 29.
- ²⁶ William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1919), 85.
- ²⁷ Marilyn McCord Adams and Stewart Sutherland, "Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 63 (1989): 300.
- ²⁸ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 12.
- ²⁹ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 12.
- ³⁰ Gaston Bachelard, "The poetic moment and the metaphysical moment," *The Right to Dream*, trans. J.A. Underwood (Dallas: Dallas institute publications, 1988), 174.
- ³¹ Bachelard, "The poetic moment and the metaphysical moment," 174.
- ³² Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 7.
- ³³ Mary McAllester Jones, "The Redemptive Instant: Bachelard on the Epistemological and Existential Value of Surprise," *Philosophy Today* 47 (2003): 124.
- ³⁴ McAllester Jones, "The Redemptive Instant," 126.
- ³⁵ Alister E. McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 450.
- ³⁶ Ephesians 2:5.
- ³⁷ Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, 54.
- ³⁸ Gerald M. Edelman, *Wider Than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 11.
- ³⁹ Hinton Ladson, "Temporality and the Torments of Time," *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 60, no. 3 (2015): 354.
- ⁴⁰ Hinton Ladson, "Temporality and the torments of time," 363.
- ⁴¹ Jessica Wiskus, "Thought time and musical time," *Angelaki* 11, no.2 (2006): 183.
- ⁴² Jean Lescure, "Introduction to Bachelard's Poetics," in Gaston Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, trans. Eileen Rizo-Patron (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013), 70.
- ⁴³ Gaston Bachelard, "Preface to Martin Buber's *I and Thou*," trans. Edward K. Kaplan, in *Adventures in Phenomenology: Gaston Bachelard* (New York: Suny Press, 2017), 272.
- ⁴⁴ Gaston Bachelard, "Preface to Martin Buber's *I and Thou*," 272.
- ⁴⁵ Gaston Bachelard, "Preface to Martin Buber's *I and Thou*," 271.
- ⁴⁶ Gaston Bachelard, "Preface to Martin Buber's *I and Thou*," 272.
- ⁴⁷ Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*, trans. Gerald Moore and Stuart Elden (London: Continuum, 2004), 15.
- ⁴⁸ Gaston Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, 137.
- ⁴⁹ Saige Walton, "Cruising the Unknown: Film as Rhythm and Embodied Apperhension in *L'Inconnu du lac/Stranger by the Lake*," *New Review of Film and Television Studies* 16, no.3 (2018): 18.