# CINEMA:

# THE "COUNTER-REALIZATION" OF

# PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

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## THE VISIBLE AND THE UTTERABLE

The visible cannot be expressed in words; what is said in words cannot be seen. The question is: Is it *because* of this particular exclusion and unique condition that the visible is seen, and the utterable uttered? Despite being *completely disjunctive*, perception and language remain part of human reality, referring constantly to one another and, as with Wittgenstein's famous dictum, that of which we cannot speak should be passed over in silence. Is it true that what can be said and thought is completely dependent on the visible and audible, *in order for us to say anything meaningful at all?*

For Gilles Deleuze, the utterable is slightly distanced from itself because it has to actualize its meaning successively, syllable by syllable and world by world, while the visible provides a "reservoir" for what can be uttered. The visible and the audible have an unrelenting virtual presence compared with what can be extracted from it in thought and language. Of interest to Deleuze are the laws that govern the visible, which, for him, is temporal in nature. The visible needs consciously and continuously be updated too, but it is not subject to the process of succession and successivity that is inherent in language. Images, unlike linguistic signs, are not exoreferential. What is particularly meaningful about images is that they are visible, unmediated, exerting of their presence in every moment. "Nothing is every secret, even though nothing is ever immediately visible or directly readable."[1] Each image is always full, "a saturated system"[2] that can never be exhausted by the statements that can take it over.

> We know that an image [...] involves several levels of perception, and that the reader of images has at *his disposal a certain amount of freedom in his choice of the level* (even if he is not aware of this freedom). [...] [In other words], *the meaning of an image is never certain.* Language eliminates this freedom, but also this uncertainty [if you're on the "optimal

level" of the observed image, M.S.] […]. Thus, every written word has a function of authority insofar as *it* chooses — by proxy, so to speak — instead of the eye. *The image freezes an endless number of possibilities;* words determine a single certainty. […] [W]hen combined, the latter serves to <u>disappoint</u> the former.[3]

An image offers up, promises, meaning, but never at a cost, because sense-making itself is never simple. It is always complicated and always in the process of becoming. An image does not itself "speak," not to anything or anyone. But it does give rise to utterances, interpretations that always lag behind the superabundant meaning of images.[4]

## DELEUZE'S CONCEPT OF THE IMAGE AND ITS IDENTIFYING FEATURES

When we turn to how Deleuze conceptualizes the image, we can note the following peculiar features. He rejects the idea that we ought to think of them *in general terms* or *as generalities*, and shockingly, he does not provide a definition for them, not even a "working" definition. The uncertainty about how to define images is rooted in classical accounts that prefigured in the Latin term "imago," referring both to the *image* of the (sensual, volatile) appearance as well as its likeness (sculpture, painting). It refers to the mirrored reflection, the reflection, the ancestral portrait (the wax masks kept in the closets of atriums), portrayal (likeness of the image), as well as the silhouette (*imago mortuorum*, the shadows of the dead), dreamlike vision (*somni*), chimera (*simulacrum*), the phantom image (*imago vana*), the echo (*imago vocis*), the delusion (*imagine pacis decipere alqm*), the smokescreen, the appearance, the glance, the gestalt, the verisimilitude, the comparison, the depictive representation as well as the image represented in perception, the representation, the apprehension (*imago recentes rerum*), thought and the imagination.

The actual instantiation of images, for Deleuze, can only obtain on a case by case basis. They are not to be discovered by a common or similar "medium." Accordingly, a photograph, painting or film is merely a *cliché* if it neglects to have certain particular "effects" on the perceiver. To put it positively, an image can be described as a *process (of exchange)* between its actual and virtual components, a process that precisely through the "*fusion* of the tear" ("*fusion de la déchirure*")[5] is at the height of its own, proper, manifestation. (Deleuze

hopes that this process of visual instantiation is reminiscent of the successive actualizations of the utterable, without repeating its shortcomings.) This is not about the technical ways in which the film image comes into being through its projection. Rather, it is the process by which an image brings out the markings of the visible in order to come into contact with what is not visible. The visible trades places with the invisible, becomes enriched by it. Within each image lies a potential difference between how it manifests itself visibly and what can be said about it. The *asymmetrical* relationship between the perceptual and the linguistic entails that they do not mirror each other, but rather stand in singular, divergent, relation to each other (like in Leibniz's incompossible parallel worlds, there is an irreducible difference in intensity between them, but no contradiction). For Deleuze, this theme has persisted ever since *Difference and Repetition*. A key feature is what may *coextensively be possible, compossible*, in each image, given the abundance of what is invisible. Anyone who – like Deleuze — is sensitive to *temporality* as the epitome of the unfathomable, singular becoming of any object (its potential, power and virtuality) will be curious to find out if and how time in the moving image coincides with a philosophical approach towards time as a universal clue to differentiation.

## MACHINES, FOLDS, BECOMINGS, GENESES AND STRUCTURE: NEW CODES FOR OLD THEMES?

Is it too far fetched to suggest that the problematization of time has replaced how we are to conceptualize film images within Deleuze's own philosophical reflection? Have philosophical issues to do with time suddenly and uniquely being addressed in the name of the moving image?

Deleuze's path to the mysterious idea of "a morsel of time in the pure state" (*un peu de temps à l'état pur*),[6] leads one to a curious thought. In the 70s, he remained silent about any issues to do with time. For him, the problem of time arose only ten years later, with Francis Bacon's experiments with chronomatic colours, which provided Deleuze with the title for his second Cinema book. We need to explain why Deleuze omitted engaging with time philosophically, despite the publication of his highly successful *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* during that time. If time is really as central to his work as is often suggested — like I

suggest in *Deleuze in Wonderland: Time as Evental Philosophy* (*Deleuze im Wunderland: Zeit-als Ereignisphilosophie*)[7] — one might postulate that it's been encoded in his text. How else are we to assess this silence about time, despite its import to his philosophy?

The omission of the use of the word *time* <u>must</u> not therefore mean it is out of sight. "To *always* omit one word, to employ awkward metaphors and obvious circumlocutions, is perhaps the most emphatic way of calling attention to that word."[8] If this is true, we need to find other key terms that can capture our reflections about time. Two of these terms include "structure" (in *How to Recognize Structuralism* 1967/73) and "machine" (in *Anti-Oedipus* 1972, *Kafka* 1974, *Proust and Signs* 1964/70/73).

The phase during which Deleuze omitted discussions of time would not be so interesting had he not returned to it at the very end, when his reflections about time were fading, as though nothing had ever happened. The code words, or keywords, mentioned above are important only *if* they are linked with an anticipated change or shift in the very subject matter itself.

Had the silence of any explicit discussion of time, and the sudden appearance of his 1981 book on *Bacon*, in addition to the following two Cinema books, been the basis for a change in Deleuze's perspective on time, he would have considered his rejection of it through the propagation of his "thought without image (*pensée sans image*)" in *Difference and Repetition*.[9] *The language-based, logically-successive perspective on time would shift towards a logic of simultaneity based on images.* This is because sense, as Deleuze understands it, is simultaneously both sense and nonsense as the case may be, depending on which level of reality one occupies.

This discovery may at first seem premature, but *Anti-Oedipus* expresses a deep distrust of the *mental images* that figure in psychoanalysis: "Images, nothing but images,"[10] "[d]eath is not desired, but what is desired is dead, already dead: images."[11] The "image-concept" is important for Deleuze insofar as it stands in sharp contrast to the *mental images* generated by consciousness. The images that are scattered through space and time, that have the possibility of being collectively experienced (photographs, paintings, film images) enjoy no immunity from the danger of becoming clichés.[12] Deleuze willingly and arbitrarily explores the substantive differences between individual types of images. Images are of interest to him only when they exert a specific *effect* on the viewer, when they are able to make the *invisible* forces visible, in short: to bring into contact those great realms of virtuality whose exposure his philosophy is committed to.

ENTANGLING THE PROBLEMS OF TIME AND IMAGE

As mentioned above, the meaning and medium of images has a long tradition of sense expectation and sense experience associated with it. However, Deleuze goes one step further and passionately re-injects and reintegrates within ephemeral, cinematic images, the aura of his own productive understanding of the philosophy of time.

Deleuze develops his recurring question under the aegis of the richness of the cinematic surface: How meaning is constructed, how truth is thinkable, what it is that binds philosophy, science and art together. One might subsume all of these questions under a further category of questions: How is thought drawn to its own image, what apparatus does it deploy in just one glance? In addition to this, what role does a change in medium play, from a "time when things were said and written" to a "time when things are visible through images"? Of concern was this change in medium, defining the contemporary discourse about the "pictorial turn" and rehabilitating the visible. Deleuze thus escapes the common understanding of time as succession like Derrida emphasized it in his concept of "différance," drawing attention to the need for a "simultaneity of what is succeeding in order to understand the process of succession" where sense-making is concerned. What, then, is to be gained with this entanglement of time with image, except that it leads to properties being exchanged from one realm to another, blurring the boundaries between them?

This entanglement of time and image opens up two problems with Deleuze's argument: on the one hand are quite a number of metaphysical speculations about what it is that allows time and image properties to hang together, what it is that grounds their family resemblance. Here I include things like the explanations about the heterogeneity of time, the division of the three temporal modes, the purity of the past that has never been made contemporary, the chronification of the present and the elimination of those opportunities that allow for the fact that the embodiment of events may not be infinitely realizable in a line of flight, and so forth. Other features that belong to these theoretical preoccupations, which are strange and awkward and had until then not been placed alongside them in practice, include the seeming spirituality of images (as the sum of appearances and their dissipation) in the book on *Beckett*,[13] which has so far found few supporters.

However, what's more disturbing in Deleuze's thought may be found where he searches for the evidence, the paradoxical effects of nonsense in sense, where it contributes to Kant's

problem in the third Critique: the representation of what is not representable. For his rejection of the representationalist model entails that it's not the allegorical model of representation that will be found, but that time instead captures a counterfeit of every form represented. It is for this reason that the entanglement of simultaneity with successiveness is only interesting in relation to film and television.[14]

What interests Deleuze about the image is its virtual presence, the collection of powers that enable its appearance and disappearance.[15] (His theory for why *every* image, whether painted or filmed, is essentially *virtual*, belongs to his most interesting speculations.[16]) This is where he finally recognizes the effects of temporality, which goes for his own thinking and the possibilities he is hoping to exhaust. It next seems as though it is the simultaneity of diverging effects on meaning that paints the image before language can grasp it; but it is also this temporal exclusion of any relationship with language (*something that is either present, past or future*) that is insufficient to characterize what an image offers for us to "visually" experience and reflect on. According to Deleuze it is only when time is no longer incorporated in movement (to include the image) that its effects as pure virtuality can be felt. This is where the concept of the interval, the intermediate image, plays an important role.[17]

For Deleuze, every image manifests itself, emerges, at the conceptual crossroads that bring together *movement*, the visible and the invisible. Like Bergson, Deleuze develops the idea of *chaos out of light and painting* in his account of the *moving-image*,[18] an echo of which is also to be found in his essay on Epicurus and Lucretius, which he had already published in the mid-60s and later in *The Logic of Sense*. An image is the "moving cut of a duration," within a Bergsonian maelstrom of floating images. It introduces a delay between two possible movements, it is the "in between." The relationship between image and movement, sight and sound in the *time-image* is even more striking, when this in-between stage becomes *immeasurable* and for its part *imageless*. The visible then becomes "false," shallow, unsatisfying, through the artificial means of withdrawing the image through "false cuts" (*faux raccords*), cuts that make themselves apparent and denounce the montage for what it is: "false" — unnaturally staged — movement.

In his cinema books, Deleuze conceives of a *historical initiation of time*, where he allows classical accounts of time to flow into the hundred years of film history that moves at a faster pace. Just as there exist both a classical pre-war cinema and a modern post-war cinema, one difference between the two that arises for Deleuze is the difference in which time is mani-

fested. He decides between two philosophical approaches: classical philosophy, with its grandiose theories, and modern philosophy, that focuses on singular concepts. For Deleuze, a momentous change that occurred in philosophy began with Kant and his *fundamentum in re* in the internal and (apparently) linear approach to time. Herein persists the challenge for Deleuze to save philosophy as a system by attempting to base it on a singular conceptual approach that would function so much the better with a heterogeneous set of concepts.

The "*présentation directe*" of time in images, promised us by Deleuze in his second Cinema book, is perceived as none other than that which can be felt — not seen — through time which is <u>not</u> realized in the visible or audible image, but is placed, nestled, exactly in *between* the separately staged visible and invisible systems. The kind of invisible difference, *which thus appears without a concept*,[19] already addressed in *Difference and Repetition*, is presented in modern cinema as an interval nestling between two images that are linked together by an illogical cut. This shows — on condition of its location in the successive order of the image sequence — the incursion of different simultaneous times that generate the production of meaning. The relations of successiveness/utterability and simultaneity/imagery are in their strictest forms too schematic to describe the totality of temporal effects that can be produced as a staged commodity within either system.[20] A first glance on the new medium sharpens the senses for the specific possibilities of old.

## DELEUZE CHANGES THE MEDIUM:
## FROM LANGUAGE TO IMAGE

The lack of any "ex-cathedra discussion" of time in the years between 1970 and 1980 is interesting because a change of mind related to how the problem of time should be handled was in the offing, *en passant*, due to the seemingly unnoticed use of keywords. In other words: time emerged in 1980 under very different circumstances than those under which it disappeared. The change from the medium of the written (language) to the medium of the image (film) does not escape blame. He concurrently hints at a theoretical dilemma. Is it possible for the image to open up the "parallel world" of the visible to the utterable, to successfully achieve the conditions required for what can be said?

Why else would Deleuze change the medium he discusses, if he hadn't hoped, after some reflection, to reach the "other side" of language, that which takes place "behind" our backs, so to speak, when we speak, think and write? For Deleuze, there is a *virtual totality* (here: of language itself), "beyond" the successive actualization of any uttered word. That is, the totality of differentiations, that shapes the actual and embeds it, surrounds it with a "world" in which it only makes sense. Those barely existent simultaneous and coexistent thoughts, that accompany what is successively said, are crucial to the process of making sense during the consecutive actualization of linguistic signs. For this time of contradictory synchronicity, does there exist a better model than the visible which exists as any kind of form, *as image?*

This strategic approach to disguising and denying the concept of time its place among other concepts is interesting because this — as it were secretively — signaled a change in Deleuze's understanding of time. No longer was it the succession of the utterable and the written, but the simultaneous meaning of the visible that was an epistemically-constitutive model of thinking about time. While Deleuze was initially preoccupied with more conventional notions of time in French philosophy, where for him time was *successively logical*, understood as "the epitome of a differential order," which produced yet further differences, his reflections on the "image of thought" (*l'image de la pensée*), which he rejected in his 1968 *Difference and Repetition* alongside entrenched dogmatic philosophy, led him to modify how he came to think about the properties of time.

On his search for a way to secure a conception of the "image of thought" in his own philosophy, he would take seriously the *simultaneous relationships* between sense and nonsense in (real) images and provide the concept of time with a completely different meaning in the 1980s. He would not only radicalize the image-concept in the sense that it synchronously presented possible systems of thought, but he would also inject the concept of time with the same considerations. In his later writings it turned out that the unit of time was the archetype of a possible world, whose potency was not only successive, but to be understood to have developed in *parallel* — at least in images, especially those films of the European postwar cinema, which with their false connections and ostentatious image-and-sound-gaps would become the ideal performance venue for his new model of time.[21]

THE CINEMA AS A "FUSION OF A TEAR":
SUCCESSIVE MEANING OF THE UTTERABLE (TENSES) VS.
THE SIMULTANEITY OF VISIBLE MEANING (TEMPORAL MODES)

For Deleuze, cinema allows for the "counter-realization" (*contre-effectuation*) of philosophical problems. By this he means to introduce a playful way out of an intellectual impasse, that is to say, that the "new" medium of the cinema can lead, through its own means, to overcome ancient philosophical methods by supplying its own performative solutions. "It is not merely coincidental that the crisis in psychology, the beginning of the psychoanalytic method and the questioning of idealistic systems occurred in the period when cinematography was invented,"[22] notes Marie Elisabeth Müller. The "qualitative leap that for the first time theoretically finds its expression" lies not alone, however, "in the radical disclosure of the mere illusion"[23] of representative logic and homogeneous recognition.

Rather more importantly, film provides a model that shows how Deleuze, together with Immanuel Kant, conceives of the *disparate structure of time* events. Disparate as the flight lines of time itself, splitting up in a chronological, successive and aeonic, non-successive mode of events — so the theory goes — resembling the faked and staged synchronicity of sight and sound in film, offering a "*fusion* of the tear (*fusion de la déchirure*)"[24] that poorly ties together the loose ends of disaster. Or, explained less dramatically and more technically: The utterable articulates its meaning (soundtrack) successively, the visible (image) can simultaneously incorporate sense and nonsense (qua depth of field, like for example in *Citizen Kane*, montage, etc.). Both schematize time and reality differently, with neither being more true nor false than the other: the utterable is based on *temporal modes* and exclusions. It sharply separates actuality and virtuality. In contrast to the visible — to which I add realistic images, paintings as well as film images — changes in time only occur as modulation, i.e. as the "operation of the real" (*operation du Réel*)[25] *within* the visible. What is it that's meant by this formula? First of all, that changes (like leaving a room) take place continuously in the image, i.e. *images are never missing*, but every new image (as empty as it may well be) remains full and present. In the early 80s Deleuze is already preparing the ground for the logic of digital film images, their abandonment of visible cuts in favor of invisible image manipulation that will become the new signature figures of the digital era.

This ontological separation of the actual from the virtual gives way to a situational appreciation, as the phenomenal crossovers between both realms remain fluid: one might consider the elegant swing of the mirror image, that strikes us first and then strikes us as such: the actual image is at first recognizable as a bare and virtual mirror image only after the camera's movement — time is articulated in the image such that it is a *continuous dissolution of equally real moments* rather than as the *nuance* of grades of reality (first virtual, then actual, then virtual). Temporality is expressed through the visible as a *continuous modulation* of a yet completely cinematographically construed "reality." It allows for the construction of correspondence rather than contradictions.

The most important discovery Deleuze made during that time seems to be that the visible, in contrast to the utterable, renounces all forms of temporality. A seeming paradoxical impossibility lies behind his consideration. Which one? Well, the virtual, inactual as inactual, the non-contemporary in images can be made visible, *exactly and only because they are themselves inactual and virtual.* Insofar as something is even visible, it is fully present. (That pictures are the only way of showing the *virtual as present*, belongs to the discovery of the *time image.*) While the modular forms of time have become the "no longer-" or not "yet-" real object of the argument, because they prolong the brevity of their own successive implementation, the *modulation of the real* is merely to be found within the visible.

We are reminded of an example of the types of non-contradictory counter realistic relations of image and sound track (with each other), of the cut: Here, Deleuze uses the exception in order to show how the rule functions: Unlike ordinary life, succession of meanings and the simultaneity of making sense of them can nevertheless be staged in film through the asymmetric use of sight and (via false connections, ostentatious image-and-sound-gaps) as simultaneously *separated* and nevertheless *parallel* to one another.

Of course the cut *between* two frames is usually presented as a *seamless connection*, so that we don't perceive it as an interference. It can also be staged as a *false connection*, which we then identify as a cut, where we then also notice the *missing* pictures that would have been *in between* cuts. The visible therefore points to the invisible, vanished image that cannot be — unlike in an ordinary situation — bridged by the imagination. The way the false connection works is irritating, but it makes possible new interpretive chains of thought beyond the visible movement on screen.

Naturally, the cut not only takes place with images, but with sounds, between two tones. Here again, the cut remains mostly inaudible. The sound cut is first felt when it separates the original sound from its image, so that when one hears someone speaking they are not necessarily to be seen in the image, or, when one sees someone speak they are *heard as being silent* (image-sound-gap) as it is famously displayed in Wim Wenders' documentary *Pina* (2011). In the latter case, the cut takes place factually, between two images and two sounds. This will be conceived and understood on a different plane, than that on which it itself takes place. *Between image and sound*, unique and alone because it concerns the *simultaneous implementations of different successive events:* The succession of images functions differently than the one of sounds, a visible cut of an image has a different effect on the spectator than a silent cut in sound etc. When we thus search for a logic of the "self-implementating" instantiation of images, the simultaneity of different events, moves and cuts are decisive factors for the breakdown of its temporal structure. This simultaneity of the divergent in one and the same image is a challenge to the conventions of logic. This is because we are not accustomed to holding mutually exclusive *temporal* and *synchronous possibilities* together. We fear we must opt for the reality of the one or the other. For Deleuze, cinema makes the *occasionally positive experience of divergence* sensible that fails so famously in the Kantian experience of the sublime.

Translated from German into English by Nicole Hall.

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1. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 51.

2. Roland Barthes, *The Fashion System*, trans. Matthew Ward and Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 13.

3. Ibid. 13, 17.

4. This superabundance of meaning, so the theory goes, is due to the time structure of images: the simultaneity of different temporalities in one and the same image, but that we can't think about at the same time.

5. Gilles Deleuze, *The Time-Image. Cinema 2* [*L'Image Temps. Cinéma 2,* Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Robert Galeta (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 276. For more detail on the role of the "audiovisual" fusion in Deleuze's writing see Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, *L'écran de la mémoire, Essais de lecture cinématographique. Antonioni, Bresson, Godard, Losey, Pasolini, Resnais, Varda* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 256-266.

6. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* [*Proust et les signes,* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970], trans. Richard Howard (London: Athlone, 2000), 61 *[Fr., 76].*

7. Cf. Mirjam Schaub, *Gilles Deleuze im Wunderland: Zeit-als Ereignisphilosophie* (München: Fink, 2003).

8. Jorge Luis Borges, "The Garden of Forking Paths," trans. Andrew Hurley, in *Fictions* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 85.

9. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* [*Différence et Répétition,* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968], trans. Paul Patton (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 217.

10. Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1* [*Anti-Œdipe, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 1,* Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 1972], trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 347.

11. Deleuze/Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* 384. In Deleuze's book on *Bacon* the thoroughgoing concern prevails about how possible it could be that the canvas can be rescued from the epitome of cultural clichés, in order to live up to Godard's formula: *Pas une image juste, mais juste une image,* that is cited not only by Deleuze, but also by Barthes in *Camera Lucida* [*La chambre claire,* Paris: Seuil, 1980]. In the later Cinema books contempt for the "dead," clichéd images like the dream can be felt. "Civilization of the image? In fact, it is a civilization of the cliché where all the powers have an interest in hiding images from us, not necessarily in hiding the same thing from us, but in hiding something in the image. On the other hand, at the same time, the image constantly attempts to break through the cliché, to get out of the cliché. There is no knowing how far a real image may lead: the importance of becoming visionary or seer." Deleuze, *Cinema II, The Time-Image,* 21.

12. "One can fight against the cliché only with much guile, perseverance, and prudence: it is a task perpetually renewed with every painting with every moment of every painting." Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon – The Logic of Sensation* [*Francis Bacon – Logique du Sensation,* Paris: Seuil, 1981], trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum, 2003), 96.

13. Every image is, for Deleuze, describable as "an intensity" or "potential energy" that it "drags along in its autodissipation." Gilles Deleuze, "The Exhausted" [*"Épuisé,"* Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 1992], in *SubStance* 24.3.78 (1995), 3-28), 19. The "vector of abolition" (ibid. 21) is the problem of the — electronic and cinematographic — image that might *vanish* at any point; however — unlike in Virilio or Baudrillard — it assumes that an image's extinction exhausts its own possibilities. "But the image has greater depth, because it disengages from its object so as to become in itself a process – a possible event that doesn't even have to realize itself in the body of an object any longer: something like the Cheshire Cat's disembodied smile in Lewis Carroll. […] The visual image is dragged along by music, the aural image that rushes towards its own abolition. Both rush toward the end, all possibility exhausted." (ibid. 18). One sometimes has the impression that the image is the counter-realization of all that real events themselves are not able to realize, so that the cinema is the greatest of all possibilities and constellation in the process of realization, that would otherwise not occur.

14. Lorenz Engell is the first to put forward the provocative thesis that it is the televisual image, with its inputs and transitions, that realized the "time-image" as designed by Deleuze. Lorenz Engell and Oliver Fahle, *Der Film bei Deleuze/Le cinéma selon Deleuze,* (Weimar/Paris : Verlag der Bauhaus Universität/Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1997), 469-479.

15. In this context, Deleuze's text on Beckett is particularly informative, precisely because this is where he addresses the images of television in particular. Beckett's film — titled: *Film* — already plays an important role in the first Cinema book; he marks a backward movement: Deleuze's unfolding image types — perceptual, affective and action-image — roll back up together and try at the same time to escape the camera and the reign of the image itself, just by exploring or exhausting them and the space created by the image completely. Deleuze makes a number of reclassifications that are unusual in the second Cinema book too. He theorizes time as pure virtuality rather than memory or dream, as a feature that curls and closes itself up as a "Realie."

16. Deleuze gives it a very interesting theory of discrimination between real and virtual images: Basically only virtual images can be recognized as images, while real images are recognized by visualizing the "re-referenced objects" (people, objects) that are not apparent or do not only exist as an imaging medium. In film the real images obscure the presence of the camera, while the mentioned virtual images — as images (mirror images) — at least retrospectively can be recognized as images.

17. "It is the method of BETWEEN, 'between two images' […], between the sound and the visual […] The whole [montage] undergoes a mutation, because it has ceased to be the One-Being, in order to become the constitutive 'and' of things, the constitutive between-two of images (*l'entre-deux*). The whole thus merges with that Blanchot calls the force of 'dispersal of the Outside' […]: that void which is no longer a motor-part of the image, and which the image would cross in order to continue, but is the radical calling into question of the image (just as there is a silence which is not longer the motor part or the breathing-space of discourse but its radical calling into question). False continuity, then takes on a new meaning, at the same time as it becomes the law." Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, 185.

18. "La matière pour nous, est un ensemble d'images. Et par 'image' nous entendons une certaine existence qui est plus que ce que l'idéaliste appelle une représentation, mais moins que ce que le réaliste appelle une chose, — une existence située à mi-chemin entre la 'chose' et la 'représentation'." Henri Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit* (Paris: PUF, 1993), 1.

19. Cf. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 16.

20. Borges addressed how it would be to deprive the language of its successiveness at least at the level of production in his "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" in Jorge Luis Borges, *Fictions* [*Ficciones*], trans. Andrew Hurley, (London: Penguin Books, 2000).

21. The 1988 book, *Le Pli. Leibniz et le baroque* — which is often (back)dated to earlier history of philosophy — belongs to the line of flight of Deleuzian thinking. Leibniz stands — theoretically, practically, and with his theoretical reflections on compossible worlds, within the conceptual idea of the fold — for a spiritual universe, that searches for the possibilities of inauthentic "representability" of infinitely many perspectives on the world. *(Safeguarding of infinity, without sacrificing the unity of the universe.)* The peculiar schism of the concept of time in the cinema books is not therefore a simple repetition of the difference theory agenda that he was preoccupied with in the 50s and 60s, but the — possibly utopian — attempt to share differences out onto different (spatial) levels, without dividing them. His project was thus about searching for an "inclusive disjunction," for a non-representative "illustration" of the concept of time, that was immersed in virtual and compossible time. The desire for "a little time in a pure state" is therefore also virulent in the 80s.

22. Marie Elisabeth Müller, *Passagen des Sinns: eine medien-ästhetische Theorie serieller Darstellung* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1999), 82.

23. Ibid.

24. Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, 278. Cf. further details of the role of the "audiovisual" in the "fusion" can be found in Ropars-Wuilleumier, *L'écran de la mémoire. Essais de lecture cinématographique. Antonioni, Bresson, Godard, Losey, Pasolini, Resnais, Varda*, 256-266.

25. Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image,* 28.